1. A woman may be consecrated only voluntarily. If one forces a woman to be consecrated, she is not consecrated. When a man, by contrast, is forced to consecrate [a woman], she is consecrated.¹Bava Batra 48b states that since it was possible for a man to divorce his wife without her consent (in Talmudic times), there was no need for the Sages to abrogate the man's kiddushin. Even if he was forced into consecrating the woman, he could end their relationship at will. With regard to the woman, by contrast, since she cannot initiate a divorce, our Sages abrogated the marriage bond when she was compelled to establish it against her will.

A man may consecrate many women at one time, provided that he does so by [transferring] money, and there is enough money to give each one a p'rutah. One of these [women] or another person may accept the money on behalf of them all, [provided] they consent.

2. When a person [desires to] consecrate a woman, and with her consent gives the kiddushin to another woman, and tells the latter "And you as well," or uses another similar expression, they are both consecrated.²The first woman is consecrated based on the principle stated in the following halachah, that a woman may tell a person to give the kiddushin to an agent acting on her behalf. The second woman is consecrated, because she accepted the kiddushin in silence, which is interpreted as acquiescence.

When, however, the man places [the kiddushin] in the hand [of the second woman] and says, "And you," there is doubt whether or not the kiddushin are valid. Perhaps his intent was only to clarify her feelings. It was as if he asked her, "What would you say about this?" Therefore, she accepted the kiddushin, for she thought he was still asking her about her intent. For this reason, [the question is unresolved,] and the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.

3. If he told her, "Become consecrated to me with this dinar," and she took it and threw it in front of him or to the sea, into a fire or into anything that will cause it to be destroyed, she is not consecrated.³The fact that she discarded the kiddushin is a clear indication of her rejection of his proposal.

If she told him, "Give it to my father," "...to your father" or "...to so and so," she is not consecrated.⁴Telling the person to give the kiddushin to someone else also indicates that she does not desire them, nor the consequences of accepting them (Tosafot, Kiddushin 8b). If she told him, "Give it to him, so that he will accept it on my behalf,"⁵I.e., that the recipient should act as her agent. she is consecrated.

4. [In the above instance, if] the woman told the man, "Place [the kiddushin] on [this] rock," she is not consecrated. If the rock belonged to her, she is consecrated. If the rock belonged to both of them, [the question is unresolved, and] the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.

If he told her, "Be consecrated to me with this loaf of bread," and she told him, "Give it to a poor person," she is not consecrated. [This applies] even if she supports the poor person in question.

[If she told him,] "Give it to a dog," she is not consecrated.⁶The Ramah (Even HaEzer 30:11) quotes the opinion of the Tur, who maintains that if at the outset the woman says, "Put money down in this place and I will be consecrated to you," or "Give food to this dog and I will be consecrated to you," the status of the kiddushin is doubtful. Since the man spent money because of her wishes, one might presume that this can be compared to the law stated in the previous halachah. Nevertheless, since the kiddushin were not given to a person, it is possible that the comparison is not in place, and the kiddushin are not definitely binding. (See also Chapter 5, Halachah 21.) If the dog belonged to her, she is consecrated. If [the dog] was chasing after her and she told him, "Give it to this dog," [the question is unresolved, and] the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.

5. [The following laws apply when a man] was selling produce, utensils or the like, and a woman came and asked him: "Give me some of these." If he asked her, "If I give them to you, will you be consecrated to me?" and she said, "Yes," she is consecrated when he gives [the items] to her. If, however, she replied to him: "[Just] give them to me," "Heave them over," or another reply that means "Don't fool around with me regarding such matters, just give me [what I asked for]," she is not consecrated although he gave her [what she asked for].

A similar [decision is rendered] if [a man] was drinking wine and [a woman] asked him, "Give me a cup," and he asks her, "If I do, will you be consecrated to me with it?" If she replies, "[Just] let me drink," "Give me," "Serve me drink," or "Dish it out," she is not consecrated. Her words imply: "Just give me a drink, and don't fool around with me regarding such matters."

6. When [a man] consecrates [a woman] in the presence of a single witness, his kiddushin] are of no consequence. [This applies] even when both [the man and the woman] acknowledge [that the kiddushin were given].⁷The Ramah (Orach Chayim 42:2) quotes an opinion that requires stringency in such an instance, but states that leniency should be granted if following the stringent view will cause a woman great difficulty in getting married.

Although the need for witnesses with regard to marriage and divorce is derived from an analogy (gezerah shavah) to claims of monetary law, a difference exists between the two. With regard to a financial claim, no witnesses are necessary if both litigants agree regarding a matter.

As stated in this halachah, this concept does not apply with regard to the laws of marriage and divorce. Two rationales are given for this matter:

a) When the man and woman agree with regard to the establishment of a marriage bond, they are limiting the privileges of others, for they are unable to consecrate the woman. With regard to financial matters, by contrast, the rights of others are not restricted (Rashba).

b) There is a fundamental difference between the function of witnesses in cases involving financial matters and their function with regard to wedding and divorce. With regard to financial matters, the function of witnesses is to clarify the truth (eidei berur). With regard to marriage and divorce, by contrast, the witnesses' function is to notarize the event (eidei kiyyum). For a marriage bond to be established - or broken - even when the husband and wife agree that the event took place, witnesses must observe the proceedings (Tumim 90:14, Tzaphnat Paneach, Kallei HaTorah). Surely this applies when [a man] consecrates [a woman] without any witnesses at all [observing the act].

When [a man] consecrates [a woman] in the presence of individuals who are disqualified from serving as witnesses by Scriptural law, she is not consecrated. [When he consecrates her in the presence of] individuals who are disqualified from serving as witnesses by Rabbinic law,⁸This ruling sheds light on a theme of larger scope: the interrelation between Rabbinic law and Scriptural law. For the fact that a woman needs a get to marry another person appears to indicate that according to Scriptural law, the kiddushin are effective. or in the presence of witnesses regarding whom there is doubt whether or not they are acceptable according to Scriptural law, [the following rules apply:] If he desires to consummate the marriage, he should consecrate the woman again in the presence of acceptable witnesses. If he does not desire to consummate the marriage, the woman must receive a get from him [to enable her to marry others], because of the doubt.⁹Many of the manuscript copies and early printings of the Mishneh Torah state that the obligation to give a get is of Rabbinic origin. This view would appear to be supported by the Rambam's ruling in Chapter 5, Halachah 1. [This ruling applies] even when the woman denies [the matter], contradicting the witnesses and saying that she was never consecrated.

This ruling applies with regard to all situations in which the status of the kiddushin is in doubt. If [the man] desires to consummate the marriage, he should consecrate the woman again in a manner that is unequivocally acceptable. If he does not desire to consummate the marriage, the woman must receive a get from him, because of the doubt.

7. When a minor consecrates [a woman], his kiddushin are of no consequence. When, by contrast, a male past the age of majority consecrates a girl below the age of majority who is an orphan,¹⁰If she is not an orphan and has never been married, the right to consecrate her belongs to her father, not to her. or who has left her father's authority,¹¹I.e., she was married, the marriage was consummated, and then she was either divorced or widowed. In this and the above instance, the girl does not have sufficient authority to create a marriage bond that is binding according to Scriptural law. Nevertheless, a bond that is binding according to Rabbinic law may be established, as the halachah continues to explain.

The Ramah (Even HaEzer 155:2) quotes opinions that maintain that the above applies only when the girl's marriage was arranged by her brother or her mother. If she arranged the marriage herself, it is not binding, even according to Rabbinic law. The Ra'avad mentions a third opinion, which states that for a girl between the ages of six and ten, the marriage must be arranged by her family to be binding. After the age of ten, it is binding even if she arranged it herself. [different rules apply]: If she is below the age of six, even if she is one who shows deep understanding of secret matters,¹²Our translation is based on the commentary of Metzudot on Isaiah 3:3. and can differentiate and discern, she is not married, and there is no need for mi'un.¹³The annulment of a marriage that a girl below the age of majority initiates, as explained in the following halachah.

When a girl is below the age of six, we assume that she does not have sufficient understanding of the nature of marriage to make a commitment that is binding in any way.

If she is more than ten years old, even when she is very foolish, since she willingly accepted the kiddushin, she is consecrated [according to Rabbinic law] and [must perform] mi'un [should she desire to nullify the marriage]. If she is between the ages of six and ten, [the rabbis] must evaluate her ability to discern. If she is able to differentiate and discern with regard to matters of marriage and kiddushin, [the marriage is binding according to Rabbinic law] and mi'un is necessary. If she lacks [this degree of discernment], she is not consecrated [at all], and need not perform mi'un [to nullify the marriage].

8. What is meant by the statement that she is consecrated [according to Rabbinic law], and [must perform] mi'un [should she desire to nullify the marriage]? If she was consecrated but no longer desires to remain with her husband, she must perform mi'un in the presence of two witnesses. She should say: "I no longer desire him." Afterwards, she leaves [the relationship] without a divorce, as will be explained in Hilchot Gerushin.¹⁴Chapter 11, Halachah 8.

Why does she leave [the relationship] without a divorce? Because the consecration is not absolutely binding according to Scriptural law; it is merely a Rabbinic institution. [According to Scriptural law, the outcome] is tentative. If she continues living with her husband until she reaches the age of majority, the kiddushin are finalized, and she becomes a married woman in the complete sense of the term.¹⁵As the Rambam states in Hilchot Gerushin 11:6, if the girl reaches majority before she states that she desires to nullify the marriage bond, Rabbinic law requires her to receive a get before she marries another person. If she continues living with her husband and they engage in sexual relations after she attains majority, the marriage bond is binding according to Scriptural law. There is no need for [her husband] to consecrate her again after she attains majority. If she does not want [to continue] living with him, she must perform mi'un; she then leaves [the relationship] without a divorce.

9. When a male deaf mute marries a mentally competent woman, or a female deaf mute marries a mentally competent man, the marriage bond is not absolutely binding according to Scriptural law; it is merely a Rabbinic institution. Therefore, if a mentally competent man consecrates the wife of a deaf mute man who is herself mentally competent, she is considered to be consecrated to the mentally competent man. He must give her a get, and she is permitted to remain married to her deaf mute husband.¹⁶The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's decision, stating that the woman should not be allowed to remain married to her deaf mute husband. The Maggid Mishneh justifies the Rambam's decision, explaining that since the marriage of a deaf mute is a Rabbinic institution, our Sages did not impose the same restrictions that would apply had the marriage been effective according to Scriptural law.

Others state that the Rambam's ruling applies only when the mentally competent man merely consecrated the deaf mute's wife. If he consummated the marriage (nisu'in), the deaf mute is forbidden to continue living with her after her divorce.

When, by contrast, a mentally incompetent man consecrates a mentally competent woman, or a mentally competent man consecrates a mentally incompetent woman, the marriage bond is not at all binding - neither according to Scriptural law nor according to Rabbinic law.¹⁷Our Sages differentiated between the marriage of a deaf mute and that of a mentally incompetent person as follows: the marriage of a deaf mute may be harmonious and has the possibility of enduring. The marriage of a mentally incompetent person, by contrast, will surely be plagued by friction and will not endure. For a mentally competent will never be comfortable living with a mentally incompetent person. (See Chapter 11, Halachah 6 and Yevamot 112b.)

The Ramah (Even HaEzer 44:2) states that this is a sensitive matter, for it is difficult to determine when a person is completely incompetent or not.

10. When a sexually impotent male - whether a s'ris chamah or a s'ris adam - consecrates [a woman], and similarly, when [a man] consecrates an aylonit, the kiddushin are absolutely binding.¹⁸All the terms mentioned in this halachah are explained in Chapter 2. Although s'ris adam (a person who has been castrated) is forbidden to marry, if he violates this prohibition, the marriage bond is binding and a get is required for severing the relationship. With regard to an aylonit, see Chapter 24, Halachot 1-2, and the accompanying notes.

11. When a tumtum or an androgynous consecrates a woman, or when either of these individuals has been consecrated by a man, there is doubt whether these kiddushin are binding, and because of the doubt, a get is required.¹⁹The Ramah (Even HaEzer 44:5) quotes the Tur as stating that an androgynous is considered to be a male, and the kiddushin that he gives are binding.

12. When a person consecrates one of the women forbidden as arayot, his act is of no consequence. For kiddushin are not binding with regard to these forbidden relationships, with the exception of [kiddushin given] a niddah. When a man consecrates a niddah, the kiddushin are binding absolutely. It is, nevertheless, improper to do so.²⁰This ruling is relevant in the present age, for it is frequent that a woman is a niddah at the time of a marriage. A wedding should never be planned to coincide with the woman's niddah state. Nevertheless, since weddings are often planned well in advance, and women's menstrual cycles are flexible, it is possible that the calculations will be in error, and the wedding will be scheduled for the time when the woman is a niddah. In such a situation, the commonly accepted ruling is to hold the wedding. Nevertheless, restrictions are placed on the couple's being in private until the woman purifies herself. Needless to say, sexual relations are forbidden.

13. When a married woman accepts kiddushin from another man in the presence of her husband, she is considered to be consecrated to the second man. For a woman's word is accepted when she tells her husband to his face that he had divorced her. We assume it axiomatically that a woman would not act so brazenly in her husband's presence [unless it were true].²¹The Ra'avad states that the woman's word should be accepted only insofar as to require her to receive a get from the second person. She is not allowed to marry him, nor may she collect her ketubah from her first husband unless she proves that she has been divorced. The Ramah (Even HaEzer 17:2) states that in the present age, since brazen behavior is more common, the presumption upon which the Rambam's ruling rests is no longer a viable support.

If, however, the other person consecrates her outside her husband's presence, these kiddushin are not considered to be binding unless she brings proof that she was divorced before she was consecrated. As long as she is outside her husband's presence, it is possible that she will act brazenly.

14. When a man consecrates one of the shniyot or a woman forbidden because of a negative commandment [not associated with karet] or because of a positive commandment, the kiddushin are binding absolutely. [The same ruling applies when] a yavam consecrates a woman who was married to the same man as his yevamah.²²The situation is as follows: A man who was married to two women died while childless. As required by Deuteronomy, Chapter 5, one of his brothers (the yavam) marries one of his widows (the yevamah). Afterwards, neither the yavam nor any other of the deceased's brothers is allowed to marry the deceased's second wife. (See Hilchot Yibbum 1:12.)

There is one exception to the above principle: when a person other than [the yavam] consecrates a yevamah, [the question is unresolved, and] the status of the kiddushin is in doubt. For our Sages were unsure whether the kiddushin of a yevamah are valid, like those of others in which the relationship is forbidden by merely a negative commandment, or whether the kiddushin are of no consequence, as in the case of an incestuous relationship.

In all the situations mentioned above, although the man who gave the kiddushin is forbidden to consummate the marriage, he must terminate it by giving a get.

15. [When] a man consecrates a gentile woman or a [Canaanite] maidservant, the kiddushin are of no consequence; the woman's status is the same after receiving the kiddushin as beforehand. Similarly, when a gentile or a [Canaanite] servant consecrates a Jewish woman, the kiddushin are of no consequence.

When an apostate Jew consecrates [a woman], his kiddushin are absolutely valid, despite the fact that he willingly worships a false deity. The woman must receive a get from him.²³Rav David Cohen (Section 9, Responsum 1) states that the intent is that we are obligated to force the apostate to divorce his wife, lest he cause her to violate Torah law.

16. When a man consecrates a woman who is half a maidservant and half a free woman,²⁴E.g., a Canaanite maidservant who was owned in partnership by two masters. One granted the woman her freedom, but the other did not. she is not completely consecrated until she becomes [totally] free. Once she becomes free, the kiddushin are [automatically] completed, like the kiddushin of a minor who comes of age. There is no need for her to be consecrated again.

If another man consecrates such a woman after she was granted her freedom [before the person who consecrated her originally consummates their marriage], there is doubt regarding the matter,²⁵Our translation follows the commentary of the Maggid Mishneh, who explains that there is a question whether or not the kiddushin of the first person are valid. Nevertheless, if the couple marry and consummate their relationship, this establishes their wedding bond. and the status of both their kiddushin is in doubt.

17. What then is a shifchah charufah [a betrothed maidservant] as described by the Torah [Leviticus 19:20]? A woman who is half a maidservant and half a free woman, who was consecrated by a Hebrew servant.

When a male who is half a servant and half a free man consecrates a woman, [the matter is unresolved, and] the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.

18. When a drunk gives [a woman] kiddushin, they are valid, even if he is very drunk. If he reaches a state of drunkenness comparable to that of Lot,²⁶Who was totally unaware of what he was doing (Genesis, Chapter 19). the kiddushin are of no consequence. This matter requires ample deliberation.

19. When a man gives money worth less than a p'rutah as kiddushin, the kiddushin are not valid. When a man consecrates a woman with food or with a utensil worth less than a p'rutah, the status of the kiddushin is in doubt; perhaps the kiddushin are worth a p'rutah in another place.

From this one can deduce that whenever a person consecrates a woman with an article worth money, if it is worth a p'rutah in that country the kiddushin are definitely binding. If it is not worth a p'rutah [there], the status of the kiddushin is in doubt [as above].²⁷The commentaries (see Beit Shmuel 31:6) debate the status of the kiddushin when one knows for a fact that they are worth a p'rutah in another place. Some maintain that they are absolutely binding, and others maintain that their status remains doubtful.

It appears to me that if [a man] consecrated [a woman] with cooked food, a vegetable that will not be preserved or the like, and the item is not worth a p'rutah in that place, the kiddushin are not binding at all. For by the time this item reaches another place, it will spoil and be worthless. This is a reasonable inference; one may rely on it.

20. When [a man] consecrates a woman with less than a p'rutah's worth, or he consecrates two women with a p'rutah, the women are not consecrated. [This applies] even when he sends wedding presents [worth more than a p'rutah] afterwards. Similarly, when a minor consecrates a woman, the kiddushin are not valid, despite the fact that he sent marriage presents after he had attained majority. [This ruling was delivered because the presents] were sent because of the original kiddushin, which were invalid [and therefore are not considered to be significant in their own right].

21. When [a man] consecrates a woman by [giving her] money or a legal document, he does not have to place the kiddushin in her hand. Instead, if she consents that he throw them to her and he does so, she is consecrated, whether he throws them into her hand, her bosom, her courtyard or her field.²⁸The Tur (Even HaEzer 30) states that the woman's field or courtyard must be protected. It is possible to state that this is the Rambam's opinion as well, and he relies on the statements he makes in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 4:9 regarding giving a present (Kessef Mishneh). Nevertheless, it is possible to differentiate between the two and explain that the laws governing kiddushin are more lenient. The Beit Shmuel 30:3 maintains that this is the view of the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 30:1). See Chelkat Mechokeik 30:2.

If she is standing in a domain belonging to her [prospective] husband, he must place them in her hand or in her bosom. If she is standing in a domain that belongs to both of them, and he threw kiddushin to her with her consent, but they did not reach her hand or her bosom, the status of the kiddushin is in doubt. Even when she tells him, "Put the kiddushin down in this place," if the place belongs to both of them the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.²⁹Although this would not be acceptable with regard to a business transaction (Hilchot Mechirah, Chapter 4), an exception is made here, because of the possibility that the man lent the woman rights to his share of the property.

22. [The following rules apply when the two] are standing in the public domain or in a domain that does not belong to either of them, and he throws kiddushin to her: If they are closer to him, she is not consecrated. If they are closer to her, she is consecrated. If they are halfway between the two of them, or if there is doubt whether they were closer to him or to her,³⁰See the Beit Shmuel 29:9, which interprets this as meaning that two pairs of witnesses observed the throwing of the kiddushin, one maintained that the kiddushin were able to be guarded by the man, and one that they were able to be guarded by the woman. If, however, there was only one pair of witnesses, and they were unsure whether the woman could guard them, the kiddushin are not effective, because it is as if they were given without being observed by witnesses. and they were lost before they reached her hand, there is doubt regarding the status of the kiddushin.

What is meant by "closer to him," or "closer to her"? A situation in which he can guard [the kiddushin] and she cannot is considered as "closer to him." One in which she can guard them and he cannot is considered to be "closer to her."³¹The Makneh states that the Rambam relies on his statements in Hilchot Gerushin 5:13, which state that the woman must be able to bend over and take the object. Others do not make such a stipulation. One in which they can both guard them or neither can guard them is considered to be "halfway between the two of them."