1. When a man consecrates a woman with an object from which it is forbidden to derive benefit - e.g., a mixture of milk and meat, chametz on Pesach, or other similar objects from which it is prohibited to derive benefit - she is not consecrated.¹Since it is forbidden to derive benefit from the article, according to the Torah, it has no value whatsoever. For a woman to be consecrated, she must receive an article worth a p'rutah. [This ruling applies] even if the prohibition against deriving benefit from the object is merely Rabbinic in origin²The Maggid Mishneh and the Tur (Even HaEzer 28) understand the Rambam as saying that all articles that are forbidden to be used by Rabbinic decree cannot establish a bond of kiddushin. Rav Yosef Karo (in the Kessef Mishneh) differs and explains that the example given by the Rambam specifies the scope of the ruling. Only when a Rabbinic commandment has its source in a prohibition from the Torah are the kiddushin of no effect.

From the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Pesachim 2:1), his view is clearly that even if the prohibition is entirely Rabbinic in origin, the kiddushin are not binding.

In the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 28:21), Rav Yosef Karo follows the opinion of Rabbenu Asher, who states that if the article is forbidden by force of Rabbinic decree, and that prohibition has no source in the Torah, the kiddushin are binding. If the prohibition has its source in the Torah, the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.

(The rationale for this ruling is that since, according to Scriptural law, the article is worth money, and the woman accepts it as kiddushin, the criteria for kiddushin have been met.)

The Beit Shmuel 28:52 justifies the Maggid Mishneh's interpretation of the Rambam's view, explaining that since in practice the article is worthless because of the Rabbinic decree, the woman has not been given an article of value, and the kiddushin are not binding. In support, he cites another example: The man must own the article he gives as kiddushin. If he acquired that article through a kinyan (contractual act) that is Rabbinic in origin and is not accepted by Scriptural law, the kiddushin are binding.

Kin'at Eliyahu explains that the difference between these two views can be explained using the concepts of cheftza (the article) and gavra (the person). The Rambam's perspective puts the emphasis on the person, the woman receiving the kiddushin. She must receive an object from which she can derive benefit. Hence, since the Rabbis forbade deriving benefit from such an object, the kiddushin are not binding.

Rabbenu Asher, by contrast, puts the emphasis on the article given as kiddushin. For kiddushin to be effective, an article that is worth a p'rutah must be given. Since according to Scriptural law the article has intrinsic worth, the fact that our Sages forbade using it is not relevant in this context. - e.g., chametz during the sixth hour on the fourteenth of Nisan.

2. If a man transgresses and sells an article from which it is forbidden to derive benefit, and consecrates [a woman] with the money [he receives] for it, the kiddushin are valid. [There is one] exception. If a person consecrates a woman with the money [received] for a false deity, the kiddushin are not valid. For it is forbidden to derive benefit from the money received for a false deity, just as [it is forbidden to derive benefit from] the false deity itself.³See Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 7:9.

When [a man] consecrates [a woman] with the dung of cows [consecrated to] a false deity, the kiddushin are not valid. For it is forbidden to derive benefit from anything produced by entities [consecrated to] a false deity, as [Deuteronomy 13:18] states: "Let nothing that is condemned cling to your hand."

If, by contrast, [a man] consecrates [a woman] with the dung of an ox condemned to be stoned,⁴For goring a person. (See Exodus 21:28.) the kiddushin are binding. Although it is forbidden to derive benefit from an ox condemned to be stoned, this prohibition does not apply to its dung. For the dung is considered of negligible importance when compared to the ox.

3. When [a man] consecrates [a woman] with the produce of the Sabbatical year,⁵Although the produce of the Sabbatical year is ownerless, once a person takes possession of it, it becomes his private property and has value. Hence, it can be used to consecrate a woman. with the ashes of the Red Heifer, or with water that was drawn for the purpose of sprinkling [the ashes of the Red Heifer],⁶As the Rambam states in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Kiddushin 2:10, based on Kiddushin 58a), it is forbidden to receive money for consecrating or sprinkling the water of the ashes of the Red Heifer. One may, however, take payment for drawing the water and transporting it. Thus, the woman can derive this benefit from the water and/or ashes she is given. the kiddushin are valid.

[The following rules apply when a man] consecrates [a woman] with property dedicated to the Temple. If he was unaware [that the property had been dedicated], the kiddushin are valid. He must give the value [of the dedicated property] and an [additional fifth] to the Temple treasury and bring a guilt offering, as is required of all those who unwittingly make mundane use of property dedicated to the Temple.⁷See Hilchot Me'ilah 1:3. If he consecrated the woman knowing [that the property was dedicated], she is not consecrated.⁸For dedicated property that was consciously used for a person's private purposes retains its sacred nature and does not enter the possession of the person to whom it was given. (See Hilchot Me'ilah 6:3.)

4. When [a man] consecrates [a woman] with the produce of the second tithe - whether unknowingly or knowingly - the kiddushin are not valid. For unless a person redeems [this produce], it does not belong to him to use for his other purposes, since with regard to [this] tithe, [Leviticus 27:30] states: "It is God's."⁹We are required to eat the produce of the second tithe in Jerusalem or redeem it and use the money to buy food to be eaten in Jerusalem. Although one derives personal benefit from eating this produce, it is not considered to be one's own property.

5. When a priest consecrates [a woman] with his share of offerings of the most sacred nature or [his share of] offerings of lesser sanctity, she is not consecrated. For one was permitted merely to eat these sacrifices.

When, by contrast, a priest consecrates [a woman] with the great terumah, the terumah taken from the tithe or with the first fruits, the kiddushin are binding. [This same ruling applies] when a Levite consecrates [a woman] with [produce from] the first tithe, or an Israelite consecrates [a woman] with [produce from] the tithe of the poor.¹⁰In all the latter instances, although the person receives the produce in question because of the Torah's decree - and with regard to terumah, it still possesses a dimension of ritual sanctity - once he has received it, it is regarded as his personal property entirely, and he may use it as he pleases. Hence, it is fit to be used to consecrate a woman.

6. The gifts [required to be separated from produce] that have not been separated are considered as if they have already been separated. Therefore, when an Israelite inherited produce from his maternal grandfather who was a priest, and none of the required gifts had been separated from that produce, he may separate the terumah and the tithes [and keep the portions to be given to the priests as his own]. It is as if he inherited the terumah and the tithes from his maternal grandfather. Therefore, if he consecrates a woman with them, she is consecrated. Although they are not fit for [the Israelite] to eat, he has the right to sell them to someone for whom they are fit.

When, by contrast, an Israelite consecrates [a woman] with terumah that he separates from his grain heap, the kiddushin are not effective. For he does not have the right to sell this terumah; he possesses merely the privilege of giving it to the priest of his choice. This privilege is not considered to be money.

7. [The following rules apply when] a person consecrates a woman [with property that] he robbed, stole or took against its owner's will. If the owner has despaired of the return of the article,¹¹A thief or robber cannot normally become the legal owner of an article through the owner's despair alone. The article must be given to a third party or undergo a change before it is considered to have left its original owner's property. Nevertheless, in this instance, since the woman receiving can legally acquire the article - for she is a third party - the kiddushin are effective (Maggid Mishneh). and it is known¹²The Rambam's intent is that if the witnesses to the consecration know that the article was stolen, they must know that the owner of the article has despaired of its return. If they do not have such knowledge, they cannot serve as witnesses. Hence, the kiddushin are invalid, for it is as if they were performed without being observed by witnesses (Noda Biy'hudah, Even HaEzer, Volume II, Responsum 77). that [the man] acquired it through the owner's despair, the consecration is effective. If not, it is not valid.

8. When a person enters a colleague's home and takes an object, food or the like, and consecrates a woman, she is not consecrated. [This ruling applies] even when the owner comes and says, "Why did you not give her a more valuable article than the one you gave her?" He is making this statement only to prevent the person from being shamed [and it does not reflect his true intent]. Since the man consecrated [a woman] with property belonging to a colleague without the colleague's knowledge, this is robbery, and the woman is not consecrated.

If [the man] consecrated [the woman] with an article that the owner would not object [to its being taken] - e.g., a date or a nut - the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.¹³The commentaries have questioned this ruling, for it appears to be the Rambam's own addition. The Noda Biy'hudah (Even HaEzer, Volume I, Responsum 59) states that it would appear that this refers to a situation in which the owner is present and does not object. Nevertheless, since none of the sages of the earlier generations offered this interpretation, he is not willing to do so.

The Edut BiY'hosef (Volume II, Responsum 77) states that this ruling depends on those in the previous halachah. Since kiddushin are valid after the owner relinquishes his ownership of stolen property by despairing of its return, they are valid in the present instance. Since the owner does not object to the person's taking the object, he is considered to have relinquished his ownership. A similar interpretation is found in the Chatam Sofer, Even HaEzer, Responsum 85.

The Beit Shmuel 28:45 states that the doubt is that perhaps the owner indeed objects. The Chatam Sofer explains that the doubt concerns the object's worth. Although it is not of significant value in the place of the kiddushin, maybe it is valuable in another locale, as stated in Chapter 4, Halachah 19.

9. When a person owns merchandise in partnership with a colleague and divides the merchandise without his colleague's knowledge, using it to consecrate [a woman], the kiddushin are not valid. [The rationale is that for the division of a partnership's assets to be effective,] an evaluation by the court is necessary. One [partner] may not take what he wants as his own and leave [the remainder for his colleague].

10. [The following rules apply when] a person robbed or stole an article from a woman or took it without her consent, and afterwards consecrated her with the article that he took from her, saying: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this." If the two were already engaged, and she took the article in silence, she is consecrated.¹⁴We interpret her silence as implying that she granted him the stolen object as a present and accepted it as kiddushin (Rashi, Kiddushin 52b). There is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis whether or not he is obligated to return the value of the stolen property to her. The Rashba maintains that he is not required, while Rabbenu Nissim states that he is. (See the Ramah and commentaries, Even HaEzer 28:2.) If, however, there was never an engagement between them, she is not consecrated, even if she remained silent when he gave her [the stolen articles] as kiddushin.¹⁵For she merely accepted her own property. If, however, she explicitly agreed [to the kiddushin], she is consecrated.

11. Similar [concepts apply when a man] entrusts an article to [a woman] for safekeeping and tells her: "Take care of this article," and afterwards tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated with it." If he told her this before she took [possession of] the article, and she took it in silence, she is consecrated. If, however, he made his second statement after she had accepted the article for the purpose of safekeeping, and she remained silent, [the kiddushin] are not valid. For whenever [a woman] remains silent after money has been given, [the kiddushin] are not valid. If, however, she explicitly agreed, she is consecrated, even though she made the statement after accepting the article.¹⁶Since she acknowledged the kiddushin, the situation becomes parallel to that mentioned in Halachah 18.

12. [The following rules apply when a man] pays a debt that he owed [a woman] and [upon paying it,] says: "You are consecrated with it." If the two were engaged, [the man made the statement] before she accepted the money, and she accepted it in silence, she is consecrated. If they were not engaged, she is not consecrated unless she explicitly agrees.

If he states [his desire to consecrate her] after she accepted payment of the debt, she is not consecrated, even if she explicitly agrees. For nothing has been given her; she merely took what was rightfully hers. The debt he owed was repaid when she took the money, and she cannot demand repayment again.

13. When [a man] consecrates [a woman] with a debt, even with [a debt that is recorded] in a promissory note,¹⁷The Ramah (Even HaEzer 28:7) notes that if the promissory note is worth a p'rutah and he returns it, there are opinions that maintain that the consecration is binding. she is not consecrated.

What is implied? [The woman] owed [the man] a dinar; if he tells her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me with the dinar that you owe me," she is not consecrated. [The rationale is that] a loan is given to be spent, and there is nothing that presently exists for her to derive benefit from [and to accept as kiddushin]. For she has [- or it is as if she has - ]¹⁸I.e., even if she has not actually spent the money, from the time she received the loan, the money is hers and not the lender's, and he cannot consecrate her with it (Beit Yosef, Even HaEzer 28). See also Beit Shmuel 28:19. already spent that dinar and has derived benefit from it already.

14. [A different rule applies when] he has given her a loan [and received] collateral for it. If he consecrates her with the loan and returns the collateral,¹⁹Tosafot, Kiddushin 19a, states that the kiddushin are effective even if the collateral is not returned. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 28:11) appears to favor the Rambam's view, it also quotes the other opinion. she is consecrated. For she derives benefit from the collateral from that time onward, and thus, [as a result of the kiddushin,] she has derived benefit.

15. When [a man] consecrates [a woman] with the benefit [derived from] a loan, the consecration is valid.

What is implied? The consecration is binding if he lends her 200 zuz [at the time of the kiddushin] and tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated to me through the benefit [you receive] by my extending the length of this loan for you. It may be in your possession for so many days, and I will not demand payment until this date." For she is receiving benefit now [from the opportunity] to use the loan until the end of the time period fixed.

It is forbidden to make [such a condition], because it is like taking interest.²⁰Since in addition to the eventual repayment of the debt, the person also receives the benefit of consecrating the woman, it is regarded like interest. The Rabbis (Meiri, Ma'aseh Rokeach) explain that the Rambam's wording is precise. The expression "like interest" implies that it is not actually considered to be taking interest, as forbidden by Scriptural law. My teachers interpreted the expression "the benefit [derived from] a loan," in a way that is not worthy of mention.²¹The Rambam is referring to Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi, who interprets the passage from Kiddushin 6b as referring to a person who extends the length of a loan at the time that payment is due. The Rambam does not accept that interpretation, because it is not logical that extending the length of the loan would be more effective than forfeiting the debt entirely (Maggid Mishneh).

Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi's view is also followed by Rashi and the Ra'avad. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 28:9) quotes the Rambam's interpretation (for even the opinions that differ agree that such kiddushin are binding). In the law that follows, it also quotes the opinion of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi. Although the opinion of the Rambam is mentioned, the other view is favored. The Ramah, however, considers the status of the kiddushin to be doubtful because of the Rambam's view.

16. If [the man] tells [the woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this p'rutah and with the debt that you owe me," she is consecrated. Similarly, if he tells her, "[Behold, you are consecrated...] with the debt that you owe me and with this p'rutah, the consecration is binding.²²Although the man mentions the debt, since he also gives her a p'rutah, we assume that she considers the money that she actually receives together with the loan. Therefore, the kiddushin are binding (Kiddushin 46a).

17. When [a man] is owed a debt by a third party, and he tells [a woman] in the presence of the third party: "Behold, you are consecrated to me by virtue of the debt that I am owed by this person," the consecration is binding.²³As stated in Hilchot Mechirah 6:8, when such a statement is made in the presence of all the concerned parties, our Sages accepted it as a formal means of transferring the debt. This law shows that even when money is transferred through means ordained by Rabbinic and not Scriptural law, the kiddushin are binding according to Scriptural law.

There are opinions that maintain that the woman is not consecrated. These opinions maintain that even after such a transfer has been made, the original creditor can nullify a debt that has been transferred through such a process. Since there is a possibility that the debt will be nullified, they maintain that the woman will not make the commitment required by kiddushin. (See Rabbenu Nissim and the Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 28:13 and commentaries.)

18. [The following rule applies when a man] consecrates [a woman] with an object that he has entrusted to her for safekeeping or with an article that he has lent her: If the entrusted object or borrowed article is worth a p'rutah²⁴Our translation is based on the Yemenite manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah. The wording of the standard printed text is somewhat confusing. It could be rendered: "If a p'rutah's worth of the article remains..." - i.e., even if the article is lost or stolen, if a p'rutah's worth remains - the consecration is binding. See the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 28:6) and commentaries. and it exists within her property, she is consecrated.²⁵If, however, the entrusted object or borrowed article has been lost, stolen or destroyed, even if the woman is obligated to reimburse the man for its value, that obligation is considered similar to other debts, and the woman cannot be consecrated through it.

Although the entrusted object or borrowed article was located in the woman's property at the time of the kiddushin, since she was not the legal owner, she is considered to have received sufficient benefit to make the kiddushin effective.

19. [The following rule applies when a man] tells [a woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me in consideration of my speaking to the ruling authorities on your behalf." Although [the man] indeed spoke to the ruling authorities on her behalf - [and his words had an effect,] causing them to refrain from prosecuting her, she is not consecrated unless he gives her a p'rutah of his own.

[The rationale is that] the benefit that she received from his speaking [on her behalf] is regarded as a loan,²⁶Speaking on her behalf is considered equivalent to working for her. Hence, an equation is established between this law and the following halachah. and when one consecrates [a woman] with a loan, the kiddushin are not binding.

20. [The following rule applies when a man] tells [a woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me [in return] for the work that I will perform on your behalf." Although [the man] indeed performs [the work he promised], she is not consecrated unless he gives her a p'rutah of his own.

[The rationale is that] a worker earns his wages [continuously] from [the time he] begins [working] until the end. As he performs a portion of the work, he earns an [equivalent] portion of his wages. Thus, [in the above situation, the man's] wages are considered to be a debt that she [owes him].²⁷I.e., it is not as if the man's entire wage becomes due at the time he completes his work. Instead, for each moment of work, he earns a corresponding amount of his wages. This money is considered as a loan which is not due until the end of his employment. Thus he is in fact consecrating the women with a loan. And when one consecrates [a woman] with a loan, the kiddushin are not binding.

21. [The following rule applies when a woman] tells [a man]: "Give so and so a present, and I will be consecrated to you." If he tells her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me for the sake of the present I gave upon your request," the kiddushin are binding.²⁸Kiddushin 7a compares this situation to that of a guarantor who becomes liable to pay a loan if the borrower cannot. In both instances, the benefit received by another person causes the person who made the commitment (the guarantor or the woman) to incur an obligation.

The Maggid Mishneh (4:4) and others compare this law to Chapter 4, Halachah 4, but explain that there is a difference between the two cases. In Chapter 4, the man does not respond to the woman's suggestion, while in this halachah, he makes a clear statement acknowledging the woman's offer of kiddushin. The Ramah (Even HaEzer 29:2) puts the emphasis on the fact that in this halachah, the woman initially made this suggestion, even before the man proposed the kiddushin. In the previous law, by contrast, her statement was made in response to his proposal, and her facetious intent becomes clear. Although she [personally] did not receive anything, she derived benefit from the fact that her will was carried out, and the other derived benefit because of her.

Similarly, if she told him, "Give a dinar to so and so as a present, and I will be consecrated to him," the kiddushin are binding²⁹Kiddushin 7a derives this law by making a twofold comparison: to a guarantor (as in the law explained in the first portion of the halachah) and to a Canaanite servant. To explain: The servant becomes free when other people give his master money for that purpose, even though he himself gives nothing at all. Similarly, the person receiving the present acquires the woman as a wife even though he did not give anything for that purpose himself. Although there is a difference between the two - because the servant's owner receives money for the sake of freeing him and the woman does not receive any money herself - the comparison to a guarantor resolves that difficulty, as explained above. provided the person who receives the present tells [the woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me by virtue of the pleasure [you derived] from the present that I received at your request."

22. [To cite a similar instance: A man] tells [a woman]: "Take this dinar as a present and become consecrated to so and so"; the kiddushin are binding provided that the other person tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated to me by virtue of the benefit you received on my behalf," despite the fact that he himself did not give her anything.³⁰Kiddushin, ibid., derives this law from a comparison to a Canaanite servant, as explained above.

[The following rule applies when a woman] tells [a man]: "Take this dinar as a present and I will become consecrated to you"; he receives the present and tells her "Behold, you are consecrated to me by virtue of the pleasure [you received] in my accepting a present from you." If he is an important person, she is consecrated.³¹The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 27:9) states that clarification is necessary to determine what is meant by "an important person." Because of the doubt involved, it is proper to require a divorce if the woman desires to become consecrated to another man (Chelkat Mechokek 27:21). For she derives satisfaction from the fact that he has benefited from her, and for the sake of this satisfaction, she consecrates herself to him.

23. When [a man] tells a woman: "Become consecrated to me with a dinar. [Take this article] as security until I give you the dinar," she is not consecrated to him. For she did not receive the dinar, and the security was not given to her for it to be her own.³²Thus, it is as if she has received nothing. Therefore, she is not consecrated.

If the man has in his possession security that he was given for a debt that a third party owes him, and he gives a woman the security as kiddushin, the consecration is binding although [the security] does not belong to him. For a creditor has certain rights with regard to the ownership of security.³³The Ramah (Even HaEzer 28:12) quotes the Tur as stating that this law applies only when the security was taken at the time the loan was given. Otherwise, the kiddushin are not binding.

24. When [a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this dinar on condition that you return it to me," she is not consecrated, regardless of whether or not she returns it. For if she does not return it, his condition will not be met. And if she returns it, she will not have derived any benefit, for she will not have received anything.³⁴From the Rambam's wording, it appears that there is no reason to say that the woman has been consecrated. Rabbenu Asher and others maintain that according to Scriptural law, the consecration is valid, for a present of this nature is considered to be a valid transaction. It is merely that the Rabbis nullified these kiddushin lest they resemble chalifin (barter).

The difference between these two approaches is that the Rambam puts the emphasis on the benefit the woman receives (or does not receive). Hence in this situation, since the woman did not receive any benefit, the kiddushin are not binding. Rabbenu Asher, by contrast, puts the emphasis on whether or not the man performed a valid act of transfer. Since he did, the kiddushin would be binding, were it not for our Sages' decree (Or Sameach).

25. [These rulings were issued with regard to the following instances:] [A man] gave [a woman] a wreath of myrtle or the like and told her: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this." She accepted it, but [protested,] saying: "But it is not worth a p'rutah." He responded, "Become consecrated with the four zuz that are hidden in the wreath."

If she said yes, she is consecrated. If she remained silent, she is not consecrated with this money, for remaining silent after money has been given is of no consequence.³⁵I.e., at the time the money was given, she was not aware of it, and afterwards to be consecrated she must explicitly express her consent. Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi differs and maintains that in such an instance there is a doubt whether or not the kiddushin are binding, and the more stringent ruling must be followed in every instance. His view is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 28:5). There is nonetheless a doubt: perhaps the kiddushin are valid, lest the wreath be worth a p'rutah in another place.³⁶As stated in Chapter 4, Halachah 19 above.

26. [The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "Become consecrated to me with this date. Become consecrated to me with this one. Become consecrated to me with this one." If one of them is worth a p'rutah, she is consecrated. If not, the kiddushin are merely of doubtful status,³⁷In the Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo raises a question on this ruling, noting that Kiddushin 46a interprets this law as following the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon. In similar instances (see Hilchot Sh'vuot 7:10 and Hilchot Nedarim 4:11), the Rambam rejects Rabbi Shimon's reasoning.

In his gloss on Hilchot Nedarim, the Kessef Mishneh resolves that issue, explaining that we find that there is a mishnah in the tractate of Kiddushin (stated without mentioning the name of the author) that follows Rabbi Shimon's view, and a mishnah in the tractate of Nedarim that follows the opposing view. One of the principles of Talmudic law is that a mishnah is taught without mentioning its author to show that it is accepted by the majority of the Sages. Accordingly, one may presume that since the Rambam saw that the redactor of the Mishnah chose to follow Rabbi Shimon's reasoning in one instance and to differ with it in another, the Rambam followed suit. [their viability stemming only from] the possibility that one of the dates would be considered to be worth a p'rutah in another place.

27. [Different rules apply if] he told her: "Become consecrated to me with this one, with this one and with this one." If together, they are all worth a p'rutah, she is consecrated. If not, the status of the kiddushin is doubtful.

[Different rules apply if] she eats [the dates] one after another as he gives them to her: If the last date is worth a p'rutah, she is consecrated. If not, the status of the kiddushin is doubtful. For the dates that she ate are considered to be a loan, and when [a man] consecrates [a woman] with a loan, the kiddushin are not valid. Thus, the status of the kiddushin [depends] solely on [the worth of] the final date.

28. If he tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated with these," the kiddushin are binding if all the dates together are worth a p'rutah. [This applies] even when she eats [the dates] one after another as he gives them to her. She is consecrated, for she is eating her own property.

29. [The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this cup." If it is filled with water, the consecration [depends on the combined value of] the cup itself and its contents. If it is filled with wine, the consecration [depends on the value of] the cup itself, but not its contents. If it is filled with oil, the consecration [depends on the value of] the contents, but not of the cup itself.³⁸Since the water is of little value, it is considered to have no independent importance. Hence, its value is considered together with that of the cup. The wine is not of negligible value, but - in the Talmudic era - it was worth less than the cup containing it. Hence, the wine is given independent importance and is not considered together with the cup. The oil - in the Talmudic era - was considered to be very valuable, more valuable than the cup containing it. Moreover, oil is not necessarily all used at one time. Therefore, it is apparent that the cup is subservient to the oil, and it is the value of the oil that is the determining factor.

Therefore, if the oil was not worth a p'rutah, the status of the kiddushin is doubtful. If the oil is worth a p'rutah, she is definitely consecrated; no attention is paid to [the value of] the cup.