1. [The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me on condition that my father will consent." If his father consents, she is consecrated.¹It appears that, according to the Rambam, what is significant is the father's consent (or his objection) the first time he hears of the matter. The Ra'avad and others do not share this view and maintain that the father has the option of consenting (or objecting) at all times. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 38:8) quotes the Rambam's wording. If he does not consent, if he remained silent, or if he died before he heard of the matter, she is not consecrated.²There are two opinions in Kiddushin 63a, the source for this halachah, regarding the meaning of "consent": a) to say "yes," b) not to object. The Rambam takes the first view, while the Ra'avad and other authorities favor the second. Both views are mentioned in the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 38:9). Significantly, in his Commentary on the Mishnah, the Rambam mentions the second view.

[If the man tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated to me] on condition that my father does not object." If he hears and objects, she is not consecrated. If he does not object or he dies, she is consecrated. If the son dies, and the father hears afterwards, we instruct the father to say: "I do not consent," so the kiddushin will not be effective, and the woman will not be obligated to undergo the rites of yibbum.³Since the kiddushin are not effective, the woman will not be under any obligation to marry the brother of her intended husband. Were the father to indeed consent, she would be under obligation either to marry the deceased's brother, or have the obligation removed through chalitzah.

2. [The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] on condition that I possess 200 zuz or land on which it is fit to grow a kor of grain."⁴In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Kiddushin 3:2-3), the Rambam writes that it is necessary to mention both land and money, because it is difficult to hide the ownership of land. Were land to be mentioned in the stipulation, one might think that if it were not known that the person did not own land, we would assume that the kiddushin would be void. If there are witnesses who say that he possesses these entities, the kiddushin are binding. If there are no witnesses, [the kiddushin are not nullified entirely; instead,] their status is doubtful. Perhaps he possesses these entities and says he does not own them in order to cause the woman difficulties.⁵I.e., his desire is that she marry another man. He will then show how her original kiddushin were valid, causing her to be considered an adulteress and to be forbidden to her second husband.

3. [The following rules apply when he tells her:] "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] on condition that I possess 200 zuz or land on which it is fit to grow a kor of grain in a particular place." If he possesses these entities in that place, the kiddushin are binding. If he does not possess these entities in the place he specified, [the kiddushin are not nullified entirely; instead,] their status is doubtful. Perhaps he possesses these entities in that place [and says he does not own them] in order to cause the woman difficulties.⁶Rav Moshe HaCohen and others object to the Rambam's ruling, explaining that in such an instance, it is highly unlikely for a man to possess a field in a particular place without people's knowing about it. Hence, if there are no witnesses, the kiddushin are not valid at all; there is no doubt about the matter. The Radbaz (Volume III, Responsum 39) justifies the Rambam's decision, explaining that it is possible that the person temporarily gave the land as a present, or had a deed written in the name of another person to conceal the matter. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 38:20) quotes the Rambam's decision.

4. [The following rules apply when he tells her:] "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] on condition that I show you 200 zuz or land on which it is fit to grow a kor of grain." When he shows her these entities, she is consecrated. If he shows her money that is possessed by someone else or land on which it is fit to grow a kor of grain in a field belonging to someone else, she is not consecrated; he [must] show her what belongs to him.

If he borrowed the money, rented a field or took it on a sharecropping arrangement and showed it to her, she is not consecrated; he [must] show her what belongs to him. For when he says "I will show you," that implies that "I will show you the entity I mentioned that belongs to me and is in my possession."

5. [The following rules apply when] the man owns land on which it is fit to grow a kor of grain, but it contains clefts ten handbreadths deep or rocks ten handbreadths high. If the clefts are filled with water, they are considered to be rocks and are not included in the total measure, because they are not fit to be sown.⁷The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 38:22) differentiate between a cleft filled with water that is not fit to use for irrigation, and a cistern of water that is. The latter is included in the measure of the field, even when it is filled with water, because it enhances the value of the field. If they are not filled with water, they are included in the total measure, because they are fit to be sown.

6. [The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] on condition that you are not bound by vows." The kiddushin are not binding if she is bound by any of the following three vows: that she may not eat meat, that she may not drink wine, or that she may not wear colored ornaments.⁸The same law applies regarding a vow not to wear any other jewelry, clothing or cosmetics that women will frequently wear to adorn themselves. (See Chapter 25, Halachah 1.)

Ketubot 72b describes these vows as involving ענוי נפש, "the oppression of the soul" (cf. Numbers 30:14 . Simply put, a woman who must live under such restrictions will not be happy, and it will therefore not be pleasant for her husband to live with her.

In the Beit Yosef and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 39:1), Rav Yosef Karo mentions that the vows that nullify a relationship have a larger scope than those involving ענוי נפש; it also includes those בינו לבינה, affecting the relationship between the husband and wife (cf. Numbers 30:17 . (For a more detailed explanation of these types of vows, see Hilchot Nedarim, Chapter 12, and Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah, Chapter 234.) If she is bound by any vow other than these, she is consecrated, even when [the husband] states: "I object even with regard to these."

If he told her, "[Behold, you are consecrated...] on condition that you are not bound by any vow," even if she has made a vow [as insignificant as] not to eat carobs, she is not consecrated.

7. [The following rules apply when a man tells a woman:] "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] on condition that you do not have any physical blemishes." If she has one of the physical blemishes that cause a woman to be deemed unfit [as a wife], she is not consecrated. If she has a physical blemish other than these, she is consecrated, even though he states, "I object even with regard to these."

What are the physical blemishes that cause a woman to be deemed unfit [as a wife]: All the physical blemishes that cause a priest to be deemed unfit [for service in the Temple] cause a woman to be deemed unfit. In Hilchot Bi'at HaMikdash, all the blemishes affecting the priests are explained.⁹Leviticus, Chapter 21, states that a priest who possesses certain physical blemishes may not serve in the Temple. In Hilchot Bi'at HaMikdash, Chapters 6-8, these blemishes are listed. In addition, [there are other blemishes that cause] women [to be deemed unfit]. They include: foul body odor, [excessive] sweating, foul breath, deep voice, breasts of abnormal size, being more than a handbreadth larger than those of other women,¹⁰Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Ketubot 7:5). a distance of more than a handbreadth between one breast and the other, a scar in the place where she was bit by a dog, and a birthmark on her forehead.

This includes even a birthmark that is very small, even if it is close to her hairline, and even if there are no hairs growing from it. This is the birthmark that is mentioned as a disqualifying factor for a woman and not for a priest. If, however, a birthmark has facial hair growing from it, or if it is as large as an isar¹¹An Italian coin equivalent in weight to four barley corns, with a diameter of 2.7 cm (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Kiddushin 1:1). even when no hair grows from it, it is a disqualifying blemish, both for priests and for women.

8. When a man consecrates a woman without making any specific stipulations, and it is discovered that she has one of the physical blemishes that cause a woman to be deemed unfit, or [it is discovered that] she is bound by one of the three vows mentioned above, the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.¹²She cannot marry another man until she receives a divorce, nor may she consummate this marriage unless the husband consecrates her again, stating that he has no objections to her condition.

This ruling is given because we are unsure whether these vows or physical blemishes are disturbing enough to cause a person who did not express concern about the matter to consider himself as having been deceived about the nature of his marriage partner.

If [a man] consecrates [a woman] on condition that she is not bound by vows, and she was bound by vows, but [afterwards,] she went to a wise man who nullified them for her,¹³A wise man has the authority to release people from vows they have taken if they regret having taken them. (See Hilchot Nedarim, Chapter 4.)

The kiddushin are binding only when the wise man nullifies the vows before the woman's intended husband discovers their existence. Once he discovers that she is bound by vows, the kiddushin are nullified even when she has the vows nullified afterwards (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 39:2). she is consecrated.

9. If [a man] consecrates [a woman] on condition that she does not have physical blemishes, and she does have blemishes, she is not consecrated, even if [afterwards,] she goes to a physician who heals these blemishes.¹⁴The wording used by the man is significant. If he states: "Behold, you are consecrated on condition that you will not have blemishes," the kiddushin are binding if a physician is able to heal her (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 39:7).

When, by contrast, a man enters into a marriage contract on condition that he is not bound by any vows, and that he does not have any physical blemishes, although he is indeed bound by vows and has physical blemishes, if he goes to a wise man who nullifies the vows, and if he goes to a physician who heals the blemishes, the marriage is valid. [The rationale is that] there is no shame for a man to have had physical blemishes once they have been healed. A woman will not object because of such a thing.¹⁵The Rambam appears to be sharing the interpretation of Tosafot, Ketubot 74b, that the reason the kiddushin are nullified if a woman has blemishes that a physician heals is that even after she is healed, the husband will still be repelled by the fact that at one time she possessed physical blemishes.

Rashi, by contrast, explains the difference between a wise man's nullification and a physician's healing as follows: The wise man nullifies the vow at its source, causing it to be considered as never having been taken. Thus, retroactively it is as if the woman had not been bound by a vow at the time of the kiddushin. A physician, by contrast, can heal a blemish only within the existence of a continuum of time. Thus, at the time of the kiddushin, the woman had physical blemishes. Therefore, the kiddushin are not binding.

10. [The following rules apply when a man tells a woman:] "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] on condition that I give you 200 zuz within 30 days." If he gives her [the money] within 30 days, she is consecrated. If 30 days pass without him giving it to her, she is not consecrated.

[If a man tells a woman,] "Behold, you are consecrated to me with these zuz after 30 days," she is consecrated after 30 days, even though she used the money within the 30 days. If either he or she change their minds [and decide to nullify the marriage] within these 30 days, she is not consecrated.

11. If another man comes and consecrates her within these 30 days, she is consecrated to the second man forever. [The rationale is] that at the time the second man consecrated her, she was not consecrated. Therefore, the second man's kiddushin are binding and make her a married woman. Thus, after the 30 days pass and the first man's kiddushin are fit to take effect, she is already a married woman. It is thus as if the first man consecrated a married woman, in which case the kiddushin are not binding.¹⁶From the Rambam's wording, it would appear that if her second husband died or divorced her within the thirty days, the first man's kiddushin are binding. The Rashba (in his gloss on Kiddushin 59b) does not accept this premise and states that the woman's acceptance of the second kiddushin clearly shows a change in her mind with regard to the first kiddushin. For this reason, they are nullified and can never be binding again (Maggid Mishneh). (See Ramah and Tur, Even HaEzer 40:2.)

12. [The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this dinar from this time onward, and after 30 days," and another person consecrates her within the 30 days. [There is doubt regarding the matter,¹⁷Rashi, Kiddushin 59b, explains that the doubt is whether his statement is a conditional statement, and thus, after 30 days pass the original kiddushin will retroactively take effect, thus nullifying the kiddushin given her by the second man. Or perhaps by saying "after 30 days," the first man withdrew his initial statement, and his intent was that his kiddushin would not be effective until after 30 days. If this were so, the second man's kiddushin would be binding.

Significantly, if a person made a similar statement with regard to a sale, the Rambam rules (Hilchot Mechirah 2:9) that this is a conditional statement. Thus, it appears that his ruling here is a stringency, accepted because of the severity of the laws of marriage and divorce. and] both [men] are considered as having established kiddushin that may possibly be binding. Therefore, both are required to divorce her.¹⁸The Tur (Even HaEzer 40) states that this is necessary only when the woman wants to marry a third person. If she wants to marry either of the individuals who consecrated her, she may do so, provided the other divorces her. Although the Shulchan Aruch does not quote this ruling, many later authorities do. The divorce may be given within the [original] 30 days¹⁹Although the kiddushin given by the first man do not take effect fully until after 30 days, it is possible for him to divorce her before that date. For when the kiddushin take effect, she will be consecrated retroactively from the time of the original kiddushin, and then these kiddushin will be nullified by the divorce. or afterwards.

[Should one man tell a woman,] "Behold, you are consecrated to me from this time onward, and after 30 days"; and another man comes and tells her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me from this time onward, and after 20 days," and another man comes and tells her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me from this time onward, and after 10 days," [there is doubt regarding the matter, and] all [the men] are considered as having established kiddushin [that may possibly] be binding, and every one must divorce her. [Indeed, these rules apply] even when a hundred men consecrate her in this manner.

13. When [a man] tells a woman, "Behold, you are consecrated to me [and these kiddushin apply to everyone] with the exception of so and so" - i.e., that she should not be forbidden to have relations with him - with regard to everyone else she should be considered a married woman, but with regard to him she should be considered to be single - there is doubt regarding the status of the kiddushin.²⁰The doubt centers on whether it is possible to establish a bond of kiddushin that is incomplete. This is an unresolved issue. The latter clause states that if a person desires to establish a bond of kiddushin, but with a proviso, this is definitely unacceptable. As mentioned by the Beit Shmuel 38:68, there are authorities who maintain that the kiddushin are not binding at all.

If, however, he tells her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me on condition that you are permitted to so and so," she is consecrated, and she is forbidden to that person as she is forbidden to all others. [The rationale is that] he has made a condition that is impossible to fulfill.²¹For the very nature of the marriage bond forbids relations with another man.

14. When [a man] gives two p'rutot to a woman and tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with one today, and with the other after I divorce you," she is consecrated. When he divorces her, she becomes consecrated to him again²²In the Kessef Mishneh and in the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 40:7), Rav Yosef Karo rules that the status of these kiddushin is doubtful: the woman cannot marry another person until she is divorced, but she must be consecrated again before the marriage can be consummated. until he divorces her a second time, because of the kiddushin established by the second p'rutah.

If, however, [a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] after I convert," "...after you convert," "...after I become freed [from servitude],"²³This refers to a Canaanite servant, who cannot marry a Jewish woman. Similarly, a male Jew cannot marry a female Canaanite servant. "...after you become freed [from servitude]," "...after your husband dies," or "...after your sister dies,"²⁴I.e., the man proposing is married to the woman's sister. While his wife (her sister) is alive, he may not marry the woman. Afterwards, he may. she is not consecrated. [The rationale is] that he cannot consecrate her now.²⁵Kiddushin 62a explains that at the time the kiddushin were given, the possibility of marriage is "something that has not come into the world," for it is impossible for them to take effect. Therefore, even when the situation changes afterwards, they are not effective retroactively.

15. When [a man] tells a yevamah: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] after your yavam performs chalitzah for you,"²⁶I.e., when a woman's husband dies childless, she is obligated to marry his brother (referred to as a yavam) through the rite of yibbum, or be freed of her obligation to him through the rite of chalitzah. The Rambam is describing a situation in which another man gives her kiddushin with the expectation that chalitzah will be performed. she is consecrated. [The rationale is] that even if he consecrated her at present, the kiddushin would be [at least] of a doubtful status.²⁷See Chapter 4, Halachah 14. Since the kiddushin a person gave her now would have some effect, kiddushin given with a conditional statement are binding totally.

The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 40:6) rules that even when a conditional statement is made, the status of the kiddushin is in doubt. There are some manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah that indicate that the Rambam also shared that view.

16. When a man tells a friend, "If your wife gives birth to a girl, [the girl] is consecrated to me with this [item]," his statements are of no consequence.²⁸For the object of the kiddushin does not yet exist. If the friend's wife is pregnant, and the existence of a fetus has been recognized, [the girl] is consecrated.²⁹The Ra'avad, the Maggid Mishneh and the Kessef Mishneh interpret the Rambam as stating that the kiddushin given for the fetus are definitely binding. In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Kiddushin 3:5), however, the Rambam explicitly states that this is a Rabbinic stringency, enforced because of the severity of the laws of marriage. [Nevertheless,] it appears to me that [the man] must consecrate [his bride] again via her father after she is born, so that she will enter a marriage bond about which there are no questions.

17. When [a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with 100 dinarim," and gives her at least one dinar, she is consecrated, provided he gives her the entire sum. It is as if he told her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this dinar on condition that I give you 100 dinarim." [In such an instance,] the kiddushin take effect from [the time he gave her the first dinar].

When does the above apply? When he told her "with 100 dinarim" without specifying [any particular dinarim]. If, however, he is more explicit and tells her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me with these 100 dinarim," and begins counting them out into her hand, she is not consecrated until he gives her [all 100].³⁰Since he began counting them out for her, she is under the impression that she will receive the entire sum, and will not accept less (Kiddushin 8a). Either of them may retract their consent until the very last dinar is given.

Similarly, if one of the dinarim was found lacking the standard weight, or one was a dinar of brass, she is not consecrated.³¹For she accepted the kiddushin under the impression that all 100 dinarim were of full value. Nor can he give her a different dinar, because he specified that the kiddushin would be with the coins he was giving her. Even if neither the man nor the woman retracts, the kiddushin are not binding (Maggid Mishneh). (See Ramah, Even HaEzer 29:7.) [The following rules apply when] one of the dinarim was inferior: If it would be accepted with difficulty, [the kiddushin are valid, provided]³²The Ra'avad objects to this ruling, explaining that even though the man is obligated to exchange the dinar, the kiddushin are binding whether or not he does so. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 29:7) quotes the Ra'avad's ruling. he exchanges it. If it would not [be accepted], the kiddushin are of no consequence.

18. [The following rules apply when a man] tells [a woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with these clothes that are worth 50 dinarim." When they are silk or of similar fabrics that a woman would desire,³³The Rambam's wording appears to indicate that the reason no evaluation is necessary is that women usually desire silk, and because of this desire waive the need for evaluation. Implied is that other items that are not that desirable must be evaluated before the kiddushin are binding. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 31:1) does not follow this approach. (See Beit Shmuel 31:1.)

Tosafot, Kiddushin 7b, offer a different rationale for the mention of silk: Most people can make at least a rough evaluation of the value of silk. When, however, an object cannot be evaluated easily - e.g., a precious stone - a woman is not consecrated, because she is unsure of the value of the gem until she receives an expert's appraisal. This is one of the sources for the custom of consecrating a woman with a wedding ring that does not contain a stone. and they are worth 50 [dinarim], the woman is consecrated from the time she took them onward. There is no need that they be evaluated in the market, and only afterwards, when the woman is assured [of their value], will she be consecrated. Instead, since they are worth the amount he states, she is consecrated from the time of the initial [exchange]. If they are not worth [that amount], she is not consecrated.

19. A man and a woman were discussing the subject of their consecration, he saying: "I will consecrate you with 100 dinarim," and she saying: "I will not be consecrated for less than 200 [dinarim]." [Since they did not agree,] they both went home.

[The following rules apply when] afterwards, [either the man or the woman requested the other [to reconsider], and the man consecrated her without specifying a sum. If the man made the request of the woman, the sum [originally] quoted by the woman is accepted. If the woman made the request of the man, the sum [originally] quoted by the man is accepted.

20. When a man appoints an agent to consecrate a woman, and the agent consecrates her on the basis of a conditional agreement, the kiddushin are not valid.³⁴For by entering into a conditional agreement when he was not instructed to do so by the principal, the agent deviated from the instructions he was given. As such he is acting on his own initiative, and not as the agent of the principal. Similarly, if [the principal] instructed the agent to consecrate the woman on the basis of a conditional agreement, and he consecrated her without making any stipulation whatsoever, or made another stipulation or changed the stipulation stated by the principal, the kiddushin are not valid.

21. When [the principal] tells the agent: "Consecrate her in this and this place," and the agent consecrated her in another place, the kiddushin are not valid.³⁵Here also, the reason is that the agent deviated from the instructions he was given. [If the principal tells the agent:] "Consecrate her for me. She is in this and this place," and the agent goes and consecrates her in another place, she is consecrated; he is merely suggesting to him the place [where she might be found].

Similarly, if [the woman] tells her agent, "Receive kiddushin for me in this and this place," and the agent received them for her in another place, the kiddushin are not valid. [If she told her agent: "Receive kiddushin for me. My prospective] husband is in this and this place," and [the agent] receives the kiddushin in another place, she is consecrated; she is merely suggesting to him the place [where he might be found].

22. When [a man] consecrates a woman, but he or she desires to retract immediately - even if the retraction is made within a very short amount of time³⁶Here the intent is a specific measure of time, the amount of time it takes to say: Shalom alecha, rabbi umori. - the retraction is of no consequence and the woman is consecrated.³⁷Nedarim 87a states that with the exception of idol worship, marriage and divorce, a retraction made within the abovementioned span of time is reckoned with. Why are these three instances different? In general, a person is not precise with regard to what he says and may make statements, relying on the possibility of retracting them later. In these three instances, however, the severity of the matter is obvious, and a person would not make such statements unless he made them with full presence of mind (Rabbenu Nissim). (See also the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Temurah 5:3, which mentions several other instances in which a person's retraction is of no consequence.)

23. When [a man] consecrates [a woman] and attaches a condition [to the kiddushin], and after several days changes his mind and nullifies the condition, the condition is of no consequence and it is as if the woman had been consecrated without any condition ever having been made. [This law applies] even when he nullifies the condition in the presence of his intended bride alone, without this being observed by witnesses. Similarly, if the woman was the one who attached a condition to the kiddushin, and afterwards nullified it in the presence of her prospective husband alone, the condition is of no consequence.³⁸The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's ruling, maintaining that the nullification of the condition must also be made in the presence of witnesses. (He does, however, accept the Rambam's decision that if a man brings the woman to the chuppah, without a condition, in the presence of witnesses, the condition is considered to be nullified. For his act is considered equivalent to nullifying the condition.)

The Rashba accepts the Rambam's ruling with regard to conditions involving money - e.g., "Behold, you are consecrated on condition that you give me 200 zuz." For a person may waive a debt owed him, and consider it as received. With regard to other conditions - e.g., "Behold, you are consecrated on condition that you are not bound by vows" - he does not accept the Rambam's position. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 38:35) quotes the Rambam's ruling.

Therefore, if [a man] consecrated [a woman] and attached a condition [to the kiddushin], and afterwards, brought her [to the chuppah] without mentioning the condition, or engaged in sexual relations with her without mentioning the condition, she must receive a divorce [before she marries another man]³⁹I.e., the status of the kiddushin originally given is doubtful. If the couple want to continue living together, they must establish kiddushin that are unquestionably binding. And if a second man consecrates her, she must receive a divorce from both men before marrying a third (Ramah, Even HaEzer 38:35). even though the condition was never fulfilled. [The rationale is that] perhaps [the man] nullified the condition when he brought her [to the chuppah] or when he engaged in sexual relations with her.

Similarly, when [a man] consecrates a woman with [an article] worth less than a p'rutah or with a loan, and then engages in sexual relations [with this woman] in the presence of witnesses, without making a statement of intent, the woman must receive a divorce [before she marries another man]. [The rationale is that] perhaps [the man intended to consecrate her through these relations] and relied on them, rather than on the kiddushin that are inadequate.

[The principle on which these rulings depend is:] It is an accepted presumption that no virtuous Jewish man will enter into sexual relations that are wanton when he has the potential to engage in these relations in a way that is a mitzvah.⁴⁰In one of his responsa, the Rambam states that this principle cannot be extended without limit. When a man and a woman engage in sexual relations with a promiscuous intent, we do not say that he intends to consecrate her with these relations. The principle stated above is applied only when there is reason to presume that the man desired to establish a marriage relationship. (See also Hilchot Gerushin 10:19.)