1. What does the mitzvah of chalitzah entail? The yevamah goes to the yavam's place of residence¹Sanhedrin 31b derives this from Deuteronomy 25:8: "And the elders of his city shall call him..." - i.e., "his city" and not her city. and approaches the judges. They call the yavam and give him advice that is appropriate for him and for her.

If the appropriate advice is for them to perform yibbum, they advise him²Our text is based on authoritative manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah. This version appears appropriate, for the decision to perform yibbum or chalitzah is that of the remaining brother alone. to perform yibbum.³This follows the Rambam's perspective (Chapter 1, Halachah 2) that, in general, it is preferable to perform yibbum rather than chalitzah. Even so, the judges should take counsel and see whether the couple appear appropriate for each other. If the appropriate advice is for them to perform chalitzah - e.g., she is young and he is older, or she is older and he is young⁴See Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 21:26. - they advise him to perform chalitzah.

2. The judges should first establish the place where they will hold session,⁵Darchei Moshe (Even HaEzer 169) states that establishing a place for the chalitzah beforehand serves to publicize the matter. and then she should perform chalitzah there in their presence, as [Deuteronomy 25:7] states: "And his yevamah shall ascend to the gate, [where] the elders [hold court]...."

If [the judges] did not speak about the matter, nor did they establish a place, and [the yevamah] and [the yavam] chanced upon them and performed chalitzah, the chalitzah is acceptable.

3. Both [the yevamah] and the yavam should be taught to read until they are familiar [with the words they must recite].⁶For, as explained in the halachot to follow, both the yavam and the yevamah must recite certain phrases within the chalitzah ceremony.

The yevamah should be trained to say lo avah in one breath, [pause,] and say yabmi, so that her words cannot be interpreted to mean avah yabmi.⁷Lo avah yabmi means "My yavam did not desire" [Deuteronomy 25:7]. Improper emphasis could, however, cause the statement to be interpreted as: "No, my yavam desired."

4. If the yevamah is familiar [with the phrase] she must recite, we are not fastidious about her reading [the above phrase] in one breath. If, however, she is unable [to read], we should train her until she does so [properly].

5. Chalitzah must be performed during the day and not at night.⁸For chalitzah is considered as a "judgment," and judgments may not be made at night (Yevamot 104a). (See also Halachah 16.) [The rite] must be performed in the presence of [at least] three individuals⁹I.e., there is no need for these individuals to be formally ordained as judges. Nevertheless, as the Rambam states in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Yevamot 12:1), and as the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 169:1) states, at the outset it is proper for three ordained judges to preside over the ceremony. who know how to read.¹⁰For they must read the phrases for the yavam and the yevamah, as will be stated later in the text. See Halachah 15, which states that this requirement is a factor only a priori.

If one of the three individuals is a convert, [the chalitzah] is unacceptable. Even a man whose father is a convert, and his mother a native-born Jewess,¹¹The Ramah (Even HaEzer 169:2) rules that a judge whose father is a native-born Jew and his mother is a convert may serve in this capacity. should not participate in the chalitzah ceremony. [Instead, it is necessary,] that both his father and his mother be native-born Jews.¹²Deuteronomy 25:10 states: "And his name will be called in Israel...." This phrase implies that only those of Jewish ancestry can serve in this capacity.

It is a mitzvah for five men [to observe the rite], so that the matter will be publicized.¹³This serves two purposes. It is of benefit to the woman, for men will become aware that she is eligible to remarry. It also will make known the fact that she is forbidden to a priest (Rashi, Yevamot 101b). The other two may even be common people.¹⁴Who do not know how to read. For their presence is only for the sake of making the matter known.

6. How is the rite of chalitzah performed? A leather¹⁵The entire shoe (according to the Ramah, Even HaEzer 169:15, even its straps must be made of leather). shoe¹⁶See Yevamot 102a and the Shulchan Aruch (ibid.:16), which discuss whether a sandal or a shoe should be used. with a heel, that is not sewn with linen threads,¹⁷There are certain opinions that allow a shoe that is sewn with linen, but both the Shulchan Aruch and the Ramah (ibid. 169:15) follow the Rambam's view. is brought to [the yavam].¹⁸At the outset, the shoe should belong to the yavam. (See the Shulchan Aruch (ibid.:14). He places it on his right foot and ties its straps around his foot.¹⁹The yavam should not be wearing socks, and no mud should be stuck to his feet (Shulchan Aruch, ibid.:26).

Both [the yavam] and [the yevamah] stand before the court.²⁰The Sifre derives this concept from Deuteronomy 25:8, which states: "And he shall stand and say." After the fact, however, if the chalitzah was performed while the yavam and the yevamah were seated, it is acceptable (Ramah, ibid. 169:12). The phrase [Deuteronomy 25:7], Me'ein yevami.... ("My yavam refuses....") is read in Hebrew for the yevamah to repeat. Afterwards, the phrase [ibid.:8], Lo chafatzti lekachtah ("I do not desire to take her") is read for the yavam to repeat.

He then presses his foot to the ground.²¹The Tur states in the name of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi that if the yavam does not press his foot to the ground, the chalitzah is not acceptable. The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.:32) quotes this as a minority opinion. She sits [on the ground],²²The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.:30) differs and follows the opinion of the Tur, who states that the chalitzah should be performed while the woman is standing and bends to untie and remove the yavam's shoe. extends her hand before the court, loosens the straps of his shoe, removes it,²³The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) states that the yevamah should untie and remove the shoe with her right hand alone. The Ramah states, however, that, after the fact, the chalitzah is acceptable if she uses her left hand. and throws it to the ground.²⁴The Tur and others question the rationale for this act. Significantly, the commentaries cite the Rambam's source as the Zohar, Volume III, page 180a, which states that the removal of the shoe signifies the cutting of the woman's connection with her deceased husband. At the moment she removes the majority of the heel [of the shoe from his foot], she becomes free to marry another man.

7. Afterwards, she stands and spits on the earth before his face,²⁵Although the literal meaning of Deuteronomy 25:9 is "she spits in his face," Yevamot 106b explains that in a halachic context, the phrase should be interpreted as above. in a manner that the spittle can be seen by the judges. For the mitzvah of chalitzah requires that both [the yevamah and the yavam] should stand when they recite [the phrases they must say] and when she spits. The judges must see the spittle that emerges from her mouth.²⁶For Deuteronomy, ibid., states that she must spit "before the eyes of the elders."

Afterwards, the phrase Kachah ye'aseh..., "This is what should be done to a man who does not build his brother's household. And his [family] shall be called within Israel 'the household of the one whose shoe was removed' [Deuteronomy 25:9-10] is read for the yevamah to repeat.

8. All [the statements mentioned] above should be made in Hebrew. This is derived from the phrase "This is what" [in the above verse, which is interpreted] to mean "with these words."

All those seated²⁷The Mishnah (Yevamot 12:6) and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 169:42) mention "those standing there." in attendance recite chalutz hana'al, "the one whose shoe was removed," three times.²⁸We find a threefold repetition of a phrase employed by the Sages as a means of publicizing the matter. See Hilchot Temidim UMusafim 7:11.

The Halachot Gedolot interprets the threefold repetition as a reprimand. It is as if God told him: "Wicked man! With your body, you could have performed a mitzvah, and you refused.... The judges will proclaim: 'The one whose shoe was removed' like a mourner. 'The one whose shoe was removed' like one placed under a ban of ostracism. 'The one whose shoe was removed' like a person who rebels against [God's] commandments."

The yevamah must remove his shoe with willful intent, and [the yavam] must have the intent that he performs this rite on her behalf. They must perform these acts with the intent of enabling her to marry other men.²⁹Our translation of lishmah is based on the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 169:44).

A blind man³⁰I.e., one who is blind in both eyes (Hagahot Maimoniot, Ramah, loc. cit.:48). should not perform chalitzah,³¹As reflected by Halachah 15, this is just an a priori ruling. After the fact, the chalitzah is acceptable.

The Ra'avad states that this law applies only when there is another brother who can perform chalitzah. If there is not another brother, the blind man should perform this ritual on the woman's behalf. Although the Maggid Mishneh contests the Ra'avad's decision, the Beit Shmuel 169:48 upholds it. for [Deuteronomy 25:9] states: "[She] shall spit before his face," and he cannot see her spittle.

9. Thus, the order of chalitzah should be as follows: First she recites: "My yavam refuses to perpetuate his brother's name within Israel. My yavam did not desire [to marry me].

Afterwards, [the yavam] says: "I do not desire to take her." At which point, she removes his shoe and then spits. Afterwards, she recites: "This is what should be done to a man who does not build his brother's household. And his [family] shall be called within Israel 'the household of the one whose shoe was removed.'

10. This order is not, however, an absolute requirement. Instead, even though neither [the yevamah], nor [the yavam] recited [the required phrases], she spit and then removed his shoe, or she recited [the phrases] and then spit, the chalitzah is acceptable.

11. Why, [in the above instance,] should she not spit [again], [so that all the required activities] will be performed in the proper order? Lest people [mistakenly] think that spitting alone is of no consequence, and [they err and think] that it does not prevent [the yavam's] other brothers [from performing yibbum with the yevamah].³²See Halachah 14.

12. [Even if] she merely removed his shoe, did not recite [the required phrases], and did not spit, the chalitzah is acceptable. Needless to say, if she removed his shoe and recited the required phrases, but did not spit, or if she removed his shoe and spat, but did not recite the required phrases, the chalitzah is acceptable.³³Rabbi Eliezer maintains that the phrase (Deuteronomy 25:9 , kachah ye'aseh, "this is what should be done," implies that all the deeds and the order required by the Torah is imperative for the chalitzah to be effected. The final opinion of Rabbi Akiva does not, however, accept this view (Yevamot 104b).

13. When does the above apply? When [the yevamah and the yavam] are able to speak, for then they are able to recite [the appropriate phrases].³⁴This reflects a Talmudic principle frequently applied and stated explicitly with regard to the meal offering brought in the Temple. These offerings consist of flour and oil. The flour and the oil should be mixed together. Nevertheless, as long as the quantity of flour is not too large to be mixed with the oil, the offering is acceptable, even when in actual fact the two were not mixed together (Rashi, Yevamot 104b). When, however, [the yevamah] or [the yavam] is dumb, they may not perform chalitzah, and if they do perform chalitzah, the chalitzah is not acceptable.³⁵The difference between a chalitzah that is pasul, "not acceptable," and a chalitzah that is not significant at all is discussed in Halachah 26.

[Their deeds are, nevertheless, effective to a certain degree.] They are not comparable to a chalitzah performed by [a yevamah] or [a yavam] who was a deaf-mute, in which case their deeds are of no consequence whatsoever,³⁶As mentioned in the Maggid Mishneh, the Rambam's view is dependent on the Tosefta, while on the surface, the Mishnah (Yevamot 104b) appears to accept the position that a chalitzah performed by a deaf-mute is unacceptable, but not of no consequence. The Maggid Mishneh attempts to justify the Rambam's ruling, but notes that the Ramban and the Rashba follow the latter view. [Significantly, in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Yevamot 12:4), the Rambam also appears to favor the latter view, and his decision in the Mishneh Torah represents a reversal of his thinking.] The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 169:44) mentions both views without appearing to favor either one. for a deaf-mute is not of sufficient mental capacity to take responsibility for his [or her] actions.

14. If [the yevamah] only spits, without removing [the yavam's shoe] or reciting [the appropriate phrases], or spits and recites [the appropriate phrases], without removing [the yavam's shoe], it is as if she has performed an unacceptable chalitzah.³⁷As mentioned in Halachah 26, the chalitzah does not permit the yevamah to remarry, but prevents her from performing yibbum.

There is a difference of opinion among the commentaries whether the effectiveness of spitting is a Scriptural law or a Rabbinic institution. The Maggid Mishneh states that it appears that the Rambam is deriving the concept from the exegesis of a verse, but this is not accepted by all authorities.

If both [the yevamah and the yavam] recite [the appropriate phrases], but the yevamah does not remove [the yavam's shoe] or spit, they have not accomplished anything.³⁸Yibbum is permitted, and she is not disqualified from marrying into the priesthood. [This is implied by the verse:] "This is what should be done to a man" - i.e., a deed removing the shoe or spitting has an effect. The recitation of the verses, by contrast, is not an absolute requirement, nor does it have any effect [on its own].³⁹Yevamot 105a distinguishes between spitting and the recitation of the verses as follows: Spitting should be carried out after the removal of the yavam's shoe. Therefore, if it is performed before the removal of the shoe, it is considered a distinct act. The recitation of the verses, by contrast, should be performed before the removal of the shoe. An observer will thus realize that the fundamental aspect of the ceremony is still to be performed.

15. If [the yevamah] removes [the yavam's shoe], spits and recites [the appropriate phrases] while they are sitting, or lying on their sides,⁴⁰Instead of the two standing when she spits and they recite the verses, and the yavam's standing, as mentioned in Halachot 6 and 7. if the straps of the [yavam's] shoe are tied on his leg below the knee,⁴¹And not on his foot itself, as mentioned in Halachah 6. or if she performed chalitzah in the presence of three common people who are not able to read the verses [which the two recite],⁴²Instead of judges who know how to read, as stated in Halachah 5. the chalitzah is acceptable. Similarly, if [a yavam who is] blind⁴³Although at the outset, a blind person should not perform this act as stated in Halachah 8. performs chalitzah, [the chalitzah is acceptable].

16. Chalitzah is unacceptable [in the following instances]:

a) a woman performed chalitzah at night,⁴⁴See Halachah 5.

b) she performed chalitzah in the presence of two judges or in the presence of three judges, and one of them was a relative or [otherwise] disqualified [from serving in this capacity,⁴⁵Since chalitzah is considered a judgment, three acceptable judges must preside over the ceremony.

c) the shoe was tied above his knee,⁴⁶Deuteronomy 25:9 states: "She shall remove his shoe from his foot." If the shoe is tied above the knee, it is not considered to have been removed from his foot.

d) he untied the shoe and she removed it,⁴⁷The entire act of removing the shoe must be performed by the woman. The Ramah (Even HaEzer 169:33) quotes Rabbenu Asher, who rules that if the man could walk wearing the shoe while it is untied, the chalitzah is acceptable even if the man untied the shoe and the woman removed it. or she untied the shoe and he removed it,

e) she had the intent of performing [these acts to release herself from her obligation to her yavam] but he did not, or he had the intent of performing [these acts to release her from her obligation to her yavam] but she did not,⁴⁸As stated in Halachah 8, the ceremony must be performed with this intent in mind.

f) or a girl below the age of majority removed the shoe of an adult.⁴⁹Since the girl is not past the age of majority, her deed is not totally effective. Nevertheless, since she can be be married at this age, her deed has a minimal effect, and she can no longer perform yibbum.

Similarly, if a woman performs chalitzah in the presence of one judge, or even if chalitzah is performed at night by [the yevamah and the yavam] while they are alone, the chalitzah is unacceptable.⁵⁰The Rambam's intent is that the chalitzah is unacceptable, but it at least has the effect of preventing the woman from performing yibbum in the future, as opposed to a chalitzah that is of no consequence, as explained in Halachah 26. When, however, chalitzah is performed by a deaf-mute, a mentally incapable person, or a minor,⁵¹These individuals are all considered mentally incompetent, and their deeds are not considered of consequence with regard to Torah law. As mentioned above, there are opinions that maintain that chalitzah performed by a deaf-mute is unacceptable, but not of no consequence whatsoever. and similarly, when a man performs chalitzah with a woman who is not obligated to perform chalitzah or yibbum,⁵²E.g., a yevamah who is pregnant. the chalitzah is of no consequence.

17. When a yavam's right leg is cut off, he should not perform chalitzah with his left leg.⁵³The commentaries explain that the Rambam's opinion is that such a man should not perform chalitzah at all. Other commentaries maintain that if the stump of the yavam's leg can be placed in a shoe and that shoe tied beneath his knee, the chalitzah is acceptable. Although the Rambam accepts, after the fact, chalitzah performed when the straps of the shoe are tied below the yavam's knee, that is only because it is theoretically possible to have tied them on his foot. When it is impossible to tie the shoe on to his foot, as in the instance at hand, the chalitzah should not be performed (Maggid Mishneh).

The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 169:35) mentions both opinions, but appears to favor the Rambam's view. The Beit Yosef states that according to the Rambam, such a chalitzah is of no consequence at all. The Beit Shmuel 169:33 states that since there are authorities who maintain that such a chalitzah is acceptable, the later authorities agree that a woman may not perform yibbum after such a chalitzah. If he performs chalitzah with his left leg, the chalitzah is unacceptable.

If [the yavam] is bowlegged, his foot turns to his side, or he always walks on the tips of his toes, she should not perform chalitzah, for the man performing chalitzah must press his heel to the ground, and such a person is incapable of this. If a person with such a disability in his legs performs chalitzah, the chalitzah is unacceptable.⁵⁴After the fact, if a yavam does not press his heel to the ground in an ordinary instance, the chalitzah is, nevertheless, acceptable. The distinction between an ordinary chalitzah and the case at hand is that ordinarily, it is possible for the yavam to press his heel to the ground, and therefore the fact that he does not actually do so is not significant. In this instance, the yavam is incapable of doing so. Hence, the chalitzah is unacceptable.

Although the Ra'avad and others differ with the Rambam on this issue, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 169:34) accepts the Rambam's view.

18. A yevamah whose hands are cut off may perform chalitzah. A priori, [it is acceptable,] even if [she must remove the shoe] with her teeth, for the verse does not say that she will remove it with her hands.

If she removes a shoe made from cloth, she has not performed chalitzah.⁵⁵A cloth shoe does not protect the foot at all; therefore, it is not considered a shoe (Yevamot 103a). This ruling is also applied in other contexts - e.g., on Yom Kippur, when we are forbidden to wear shoes, it is permitted to wear a cloth shoe (Hilchot Sh'vitat Asor 3:7).

The Rashba and others maintain that there is no difference between a cloth slipper and a shoe made from the other substances mentioned. This is the view quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 169:22). If, however, she removes a shoe that does not have a heel, [a shoe] that was sewn with linen threads, a shoe made from goats' hair, the inner bark of a palm tree, cork or wood, the chalitzah is unacceptable.⁵⁶These substances offer some protection, and so the chalitzah is of some consequence. Nevertheless, when the Torah uses the word נעל, the intent is always a leather shoe.

[This same ruling applies if] the shoe is so large that [the yavam] could not walk in it, if it is so small that it does not cover the majority of his foot, it is torn to the extent that it does not cover the majority of his foot, or the sole is opened to the extent that it does not cover the majority of his foot.

19. Chalitzah is acceptable,⁵⁷This applies after the fact. A priori, none of these situations is acceptable. however, in the following instances:

a) a sandal was made of wood⁵⁸The same rules apply with regard to a shoe made from any of the other substances mentioned in the previous halachah and covered with leather (Maggid Mishneh). and covered with leather, or its soles were leather, and its sides were made from goats' hair,

b) [the yevamah] removed a left shoe from [the yavam's] right foot,

c) the shoe did not belong to the [the yavam],⁵⁹In the present age, when the Rabbinic court owns a special chalitzah shoe, it is customary to give it to the yavam as a present before the ceremony.

d) it was oversized, but he could still walk while wearing it,

e) it was small, but it covered the majority of his foot,

f) it was torn, but it covered the majority of his foot, or

g) the sole was opened, but it covered the majority of his foot.

20. When it is questionable that a sandal is affected by tzara'at, or it has definitely been established that this is the case,⁶⁰See Hilchot Tum'at Tzara'at, Chapter 12, which describes the process in which a garment or shoe affected by tzara'at is judged by a priest. There are two stages to this process: one in which the article is "quarantined" for a period of a week to determine whether it has actually been affected, and a second stage during which the priest declares that the article is affected and must be burned. and a sandal belonging to a false deity - i.e., one placed on the feet of an image⁶¹Rashi (Yevamot 103b) interprets this as a leather covering placed on the feet of an idol to prevent damage when it is transported from place to place. Thus, the sandal is placed in the category of "an accessory to a false deity." - should not be used for chalitzah.⁶²For it is abhorrent to use an article associated with impurity or false deities for the purpose of a mitzvah (Yevamot 103b). If, however, it is used for that purpose, the chalitzah is acceptable, despite the fact that deriving benefit from [the sandal] is forbidden.⁶³The rationale is that the performance of mitzvot is not considered to be a personal benefit (ibid.).

[Different rules apply with regard to a sandal that was made from an animal] offered to a false deity,⁶⁴Our translation is based on the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh. The Maggid Mishneh continues, stating that if a sandal itself is offered to a false deity, it does not become forbidden. See Beit Shmuel 169:23.

The difference between this and the previous instance can be explained as follows: It is possible to nullify the connection between "an accessory to a false deity" and the worship of the false deity. (See Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 8:8-9.) As such, there is a possibility that such a sandal will not have to be destroyed. An object offered to a false deity, including the hide from which a sandal was made, can never be separated from its association with the false deity (ibid.). As such, it is condemned to be destroyed, forbidden for eternity and considered as if it did not exist. Hence, it is not considered as if the yevamah removed a significant entity from the yavam's foot. one from an apostate city,⁶⁵See Hilchot Avodat Kochavim, Chapter 4, which describes the laws governing such a city. All the property in the city is condemned to be burned, and thus it cannot be used for chalitzah, for the reasons described above. or one that was made to be worn by a corpse when it is buried. If [such a sandal] is used for chalitzah, the chalitzah is unacceptable. [The rationale is] that such a sandal was not made for a person to wear while walking.

21. If [the yevamah] tears the shoe off [the yavam's] foot or burns it, the chalitzah is unacceptable.⁶⁶Yevamot 102a questions whether the Torah's intent is that the yevamah must bare the yavam's foot, in which instance these examples would be acceptable, or she must remove his shoe in the ordinary manner, in which instance they would not be acceptable. Since the question remains unresolved, the Rambam rules stringently. [The same ruling applies if the yavam] is wearing two shoes [on his right foot, one on top of the other,] and the yevamah removes [only] the upper one [in the ordinary manner]. Even if she tears off the lower one so that his foot is revealed, the chalitzah is unacceptable.

22. When a yevamah eats garlic, mustard,⁶⁷Our translation is based on the Aruch. It is possible that it is not precise according to the Rambam's view. The intent, however, is definitely a sharp pungent herb. or other similar condiments that increase a person's spittle, and spittle was dripping from her mouth, [the spitting] is of no consequence.⁶⁸The intent is that she must spit again in order for the chalitzah to be performed as required. Even if she does not spit at all, the chalitzah is acceptable after the fact, as stated in Halachah 12 (Maggid Mishneh). [Instead,] the spittle must be produced without any external cause.

23. If [a yevamah] spits blood,⁶⁹Rabbenu Asher differs and maintains that a yevamah who spits blood need not spit again, even if she does not suck her wound. His view is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 169:40). or if blood is dripping from her mouth, [the spitting] is of no consequence. If she sucks [the wound] and then spits, it is acceptable, for it is impossible that there will be blood that was sucked out without some drops of spittle.⁷⁰The fact that spittle is mixed with blood or another substance does not disqualify it.

If she spits, and the wind blows away the spittle before it passed before his face - e.g., she is tall and he is short - [the spitting] is of no consequence. If [the wind blows] the spittle [away] after it passes before his face, but before it lands on the ground, it is acceptable.⁷¹The intent is that the spittle must pass in front of or below the yavam's face. If the yevamah was taller than the yavam and the wind moved her spittle away before it passed before his face, the spitting is not acceptable.

If the judges do not see the spittle emerge from [the yevamah's] mouth,⁷²Although a priori the judges must see the spittle, as stated in Halachah 7, after the fact their failure to do so does not render the spitting unacceptable.

In Yevamot 106b, a phrase "before the eyes of the elders" (Deuteronomy 25:9 is cited as a support for this requirement. Nevertheless, the Rabbis explain that the requirement is Rabbinic and not Scriptural in origin, and the verse is merely an asmachta. See the Beit Shmuel 169:39. it is acceptable.

24. Chalitzah performed under mistaken premises is unacceptable.

What is implied? For example, [if the yavam] was told: "Perform chalitzah for her; this is the manner in which you acquire her as a wife," "Perform chalitzah for her. It is a mitzvah, and you do not lose any rights. If you later desire to perform yibbum, you may,"⁷³Note the Maggid Mishneh, which mentions that there is a dispute among the Rabbis about this issue. The rationale for the position that the chalitzah is acceptable is that in this instance, the yavam did intend to free the yevamah from her obligation to him. (See also Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 169:52.) or the like, [the chalitzah] is unacceptable.⁷⁴For as mentioned in Halachah 8, the chalitzah must be performed with the intent of releasing the woman from her obligation.

The chalitzah is, however, effective, in that it prevents the man (or his brothers) from ever performing yibbum with this woman. Therefore, the man is compelled by the court to perform an acceptable chalitzah, for from this point on he has nothing to lose, and through his act he can enable the woman to remarry (Rashba, as quoted by Maggid Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit. 169:51).

If, however, he was deceived and was told: "Perform chalitzah for her on the condition the she give you 200 zuz" - or "...under any other condition" - the chalitzah is acceptable,⁷⁵This applies even if the condition is stated in a manner that meets the requirements of conditional statements (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.:50). even though she did not give [him the money] or fulfill the condition.⁷⁶If such a condition is made, the woman is, however, rightfully obligated to pay the amount she agreed to pay, unless she has a reason for which she considers the yavam as unfit to marry her that the court would accept [Shulchan Aruch (ibid.)]. [The rationale is that] he had the intent [of releasing her from her obligation] when he performed chalitzah.

25. When [a man] issues a protest⁷⁷Based on Hilchot Gerushin 6:19, it would appear that the intent is that he tells two witnesses that he does not want to perform the chalitzah, the chalitzah should be nullified, because he is being compelled to perform it. with regard to chalitzah, the chalitzah is not acceptable.⁷⁸Yevamot 106a establishes an equivalence between divorce and chalitzah with regard to these laws. On this basis, the Rivash (Responsum 482, quoted by the Kessef Mishneh in the gloss on Halachah 16) raises a difficulty, noting that when a husband issues a protest regarding a get, the get is nullified entirely. With regard to chalitzah, however, the Rambam rules that it is merely unacceptable.

The Rivash offers a resolution, explaining that when a protest is issued with regard to a get, the get itself becomes nullified, and therefore the divorce is of no consequence at all. With regard to chalitzah, however, the yavam did perform all the required acts. His protest is accepted to the extent that it is considered that he performed these acts without intending to release the woman from her obligation. This, however, merely causes a chalitzah to be unacceptable, as stated in Halachah 16. It does not nullify it entirely. Therefore, it is proper for the judges to tell [the yavam] to nullify all protests [before he performs chalitzah], as they do with regard to a get.⁷⁹See Hilchot Gerushin 6:20.

[The following rules apply when] Jews compel [a yavam] and beat him until he performs chalitzah:⁸⁰The equivalence established by Yevamot 106a applies in this context as well. The Rambam discusses the laws governing a get given under compulsion in Hilchot Gerushin 2:20. If they act according to law,⁸¹This refers to a situation analogous to those described in Chapter 2, Halachah 14, or Chapter 6, Halachah 4, in which the person should be compelled to perform chalitzah.

The Ramah (Even HaEzer 169:13) states that even according to the Ashkenazic authorities who maintain that the mitzvah of chalitzah takes precedence, a yavam may be compelled to perform chalitzah only for these reasons. the chalitzah is acceptable.⁸²For, as stated in Hilchot Gerushin, the person's actions are considered to be performed voluntarily, because:

He wants to be part of the Jewish people, and he wants to perform all the mitzvot and eschew all the transgressions; it is only his evil inclination that presses him. Therefore, when he is beaten until his [evil] inclination has been weakened, and he consents, he is considered to have [acted] willfully.

If they do not act according to law - e.g., they were commoners or they erred [in judgment] - the chalitzah is not acceptable.

If gentiles force [a yavam to perform chalitzah] on their own initiative,⁸³I.e., as opposed to acting as agents for a Jewish court. but the law would require that chalitzah be performed, the chalitzah is unacceptable. If they do not act according to law, the chalitzah is of no substance.

26. Whenever we have used the terms, "the chalitzah is of no substance," "his actions are of no consequence," or "nothing has been accomplished," the intent is that it is as if the chalitzah had not been performed at all. He does not become forbidden to her relatives,⁸⁴See Chapter 1, Halachah 13. nor is she forbidden to the priesthood, and she is permitted to perform yibbum.

Whenever we have used the term, "the chalitzah is unacceptable,"⁸⁵As mentioned above, there is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis if the Rambam's intent is that these acts of chalitzah are acceptable according to Scriptural law or not. he becomes forbidden to her relatives, and she becomes forbidden to the priesthood. She also becomes forbidden to all the brothers, and she may not perform yibbum. She may not marry another man, however, until she performs an acceptable chalitzah.

27. If she transgresses and marries [another man], [the yavam] should perform an acceptable chalitzah with her. She is allowed to remain married to her husband; she is not sent away from him.⁸⁶The Maggid Mishneh states that the woman should, however, be forced to separate from her second husband until she performs an acceptable chalitzah. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 169:55) follows this ruling.

28. When a yevamah grows up together with [her deceased husband's] brothers, she is permitted to perform yibbum. We do not suspect that she performed chalitzah with one of them alone and thus became forbidden to them.⁸⁷As stated in Halachah 16.

If, however, we see that she removed the shoe of one [of the brothers], she is disqualified [from yibbum], lest she have intended to perform chalitzah.⁸⁸The Kessef Mishneh states that the Rambam's ruling alludes to the following law: If neither the yevamah nor the yavam has the intent to perform chalitzah, the fact that she removes his shoe is of no consequence, and she is permitted to perform yibbum. Note the discussion of this subject in Sefer HaKovetz. An acceptable chalitzah must, however, be performed to enable her to marry another man.

29. The document recording the chalitzah that we compose is merely a legal record,⁸⁹This distinguishes it from a bill of divorce (a get), which is actually necessary to effect the divorce. For that reason (as implied by Hilchot Gerushin 11:9), it need not be written for the sake of the man and the woman, nor is it bound by the other details that apply to a get.

Note, however, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 169:56), which states that the paper on which the document is written must be ruled with a stylus (i.e., sirtut is required), because it contains Biblical verses. so that a woman will have at hand proof that she performed chalitzah.

Judges do not preside over chalitzah unless they know the identity [of the yevamah and the yavam]. Therefore, a person who observes chalitzah can write a document recording the chalitzah although he does not know⁹⁰The Rambam is emphasizing that we do not suspect that perhaps the court erred and presided over a chalitzah without knowing the identity of the parties involved. that the woman is so and so's daughter, that her deceased husband was so and so, and that the person who performed chalitzah with her was [her husband's] brother. [He can assume] that the judges who presided over the chalitzah clarified these matters and afterwards had the chalitzah performed.

30. This is the formal text of the document recording the chalitzah that is employed at present:

On this day of the week and on this day of the month, in this year from the time of creation, according to the reckoning that is followed in this and this place, we, the judges, of whom several have signed below,⁹¹For as stated in Halachah 5, at the outset five judges are necessary. Nevertheless, it is the presence of three that is considered significant. sat in a session of three in court. So and so, the widow of so and so, the daughter of so and so, approached us, as did a man named so and so, the son of so and so.

And this woman told us: "So and so, the son of so and so, [is] the paternal brother of so and so, my husband. [My husband,] to whom I was married, died, leaving life to the Sages and to the entire Jewish people. He did not leave a son or a daughter to inherit him and to perpetuate his name within Israel. So and so, his brother is fit to perform yibbum with me.

"Rabbis, tell that man: 'If you desire to perform yibbum, do so.' If not, let him place his right foot before me, and I will remove his shoe from his foot and spit before him."

We clarified the identity of so and so and that he is the paternal brother of so and so, and we told him: "If you desire to perform yibbum, do so. If not, place your right foot before us, so that she can remove your shoe from your foot and spit before you." He answered us: "I do not desire to perform yibbum."

Immediately, we had this woman recite after us:⁹²Using the Hebrew words of the verse. "My yavam refuses to raise a name for his brother within Israel. My yavam does not desire [to perform yibbum]."

And then, we had the man recite after us:⁹³Using the Hebrew words of the verse. "I do not desire to take her." He then placed his right foot forward. She removed his shoe from his foot and spit before him, emitting spittle that could be seen by us from her mouth to the ground.

We then had her recite after us:⁹⁴Using the Hebrew words of the verse. "This is what should be done to a man who does not build his brother's household. And his [family] shall be called within Israel 'the household of the one whose shoe was removed.' And we the judges, and all those sitting before us, answered after her: "the one whose shoe was removed," "the one whose shoe was removed," "the one whose shoe was removed," three times.

When this act was performed before us, we granted license for so and so to marry whomever she desires; no man has the right to raise a protest from this day onward.

So and so made a request for a legal record of this chalitzah. [Hence,] we wrote it up, signed it and gave to her as proof according to the faith of Moses and Israel.

Signed so and so the son of so and so, a witness;

so and so the son of so and so, a witness.⁹⁵We have included these lines based on the standard printed texts of the Mishneh Torah, although it is highly likely that they are a printer's addition. They are not found in most early manuscripts and printings. Moreover, it is likely that they are a later printer's addition because the Rambam does not mention witnesses signing this document, but rather only the judges who presided over the chalitzah.

31. The three judges, two of the three judges, or two other individuals who witnessed the chalitzah, but who did not serve as the judges presiding over the chalitzah, may testify concerning the matter, as we have explained.⁹⁶See Halachah 29.

Even [the testimony of] a woman, a servant or a minor who is perceptive and understanding is accepted if they say that "This is so and so, the brother of so and so, and this is his yevamah." We may then perform chalitzah on this basis. This does not apply with regard to other forms of testimony required by the Torah - neither testimony required in questions of monetary law nor testimony required with regard to prohibitions.

[The rationale for this distinction is that this is a matter that will likely be revealed, and it is possible to know the truth of the matter without relying on their testimony, as we have explained at the conclusion of Hilchot Gittin.⁹⁷The Rambam concludes Hilchot Gerushin by stating:

Do not wonder at the fact that our Sages released the prohibition [against a married woman], which is considered a very severe matter, on the basis of the testimony of a woman, a servant or a maid servant, statements made by a gentile in the course of conversation, a written statement, or [testimony] that was not investigated by the ordinary process of interrogation, as we have explained.

[These leniencies were instituted] because the Torah required the testimony of two witnesses, and all the other details of the laws of witnesses only with regard to matters that cannot be verified definitively except via witnesses and their testimony - e.g., that one person killed another, or that one person lent money to another. When, by contrast, the matter can be verified definitively without the testimony of a witness, and the witness cannot justify [his statements] if they are not true - e.g., when one testifies that a person died, the Torah did not necessitate [that the requirements of formal testimony be met in these instances]. For it is unlikely that a witness will testify falsely.

As interpreted by the Noda BiY'hudah (Even HaEzer, Volume I, Responsa 27 and 33), the Rambam's statement implies that since the matter will ultimately become public knowledge, no formal testimony is required, and the statements of an individual who witnessed the matter himself are sufficient to be accepted.

If the yavam desires to perform yibbum, he should consecrate her, perform yibbum and write her a ketubah, as we have explained.⁹⁸See Chapter 2, Halachah 2; Hilchot Ishut 22:14.

32. On this day of the week and on this day of the month, in this year according to the reckoning that is followed in this and this place, [we the undersigned testify] that so and so, the son of so and so, appeared before us and told us: "My paternal brother died, leaving life to the Sages and to all of Israel. He did not leave a son or a daughter to inherit him and to perpetuate his name within Israel. He did, however, leave a woman so and so, the daughter of so and so. According to the Torah, she is fit to perform yibbum with me, as it is written in the Torah scroll of Moses: 'A yavam will engage in relations with her.' This woman consented and performed yibbum with so and so, the son of so and so, her yavam, to perpetuate [her deceased husband's] name within Israel, as it is written: "The first-born that she bears will arise in the name of his brother who is deceased."⁹⁹It appears in this context that the Rambam is referring to the literal meaning of the verse and not the halachic meaning, as stated in Chapter 2, Halachah 6.

So and so, the yavam, has written [a marriage contract for] two hundred silver zuzim, as befits her, as was written in the marriage contract written to her by her first husband,¹⁰⁰This refers to an instance where the woman was a virgin when she married her first husband. Since she did not collect her due from her first husband, she is still entitled to a marriage contract of two hundred zuz. Otherwise, she would be granted only one hundred zuz, as is granted to other widows. and he adds to this pledge from his own resources this and this amount. This is the dowry with which she entered the household... [continuing as in] the ordinary text of a ketubah.

33. 33

On this day of the week..., [we the undersigned testify] that so and so, the son of so and so, told so and so, the daughter of so and so, a virgin bride: "Become my wife according to the faith of Moses and the Jewish people. And I, with the help of God, will work to honor you, sustain you, nourish you, provide for you and clothe you according to the custom of Jewish men who faithfully honor, sustain, nurture, provide for and clothe their wives.

"And as a dowry fit for a virgin, I will give you 200 silver zuzim, which are equivalent to 25 zuzim of [pure] silver,¹⁰²For the coins of the Talmudic era were one part silver and seven parts base metal (Hilchot Ishut 10:8). which are fit for you according to the Torah,¹⁰³Based on Hilchot Ishut (ibid.), this phrase appears to be a printer's addition, for the Rambam considers the commitment to this sum to be a Rabbinic ordinance. It is lacking in many authoritative printings and manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah. According to Ashkenazic custom, the phrase should be included in the ketubah. your sustenance, your clothing and your other needs, and I will give you conjugal rights."¹⁰⁴This conveys a man's pledge to give his wife sha'arah (her sustenance), kesutah (her clothing) and onatah (her conjugal rights). These constitute a man's fundamental obligations in marriage, as stated in Exodus 21:10. (See also Sefer HaMitzvot, Negative Commandment 262; Hilchot Ishut 12:2.)

So and so agreed and became the wife of so and so. He consented and added to the essential requirement of the marriage contract, reaching a total sum of such and such. This is the sum of the value of the dowry that she brought to the household, such and such. The groom received this entire amount. It entered his domain and came under his jurisdiction, and he accepted responsibility for the entire amount as a loan and a debt.

Similarly, the groom has told us, "I accept responsibility for the entire [sum mentioned in] this marriage contract: the essential requirement of the marriage contract, the dowry, the additional amount, and all the stipulations of the marriage contract.¹⁰⁵I.e., to provide his wife with her provisions and clothing.

"[This responsibility I accept upon myself,] my heirs and on all the valuable and desirable property and assets that I own beneath the heavens. [This includes] those that I already own and those that I will acquire and includes landed property and movable property that is acquired via the acquisition of landed property. All of them will be liable and accountable for the entire sum of this marriage contract: the essential requirement of the marriage contract, the dowry and the additions that payment be made from them in my lifetime and after my death, including even the cloak I wear on my shoulders."

We have formalized all that is written and explicitly stated above with a comprehensive kinyan.¹⁰⁶I.e., a kinyan sudar, the exchange of a handkerchief that serves to formalize the acquisition of property, or the establishment of a binding contractual agreement. It should not be considered as an asmachta¹⁰⁷An agreement made facetiously, without the desire to keep it. or as a sample text for legal documents that is not binding. Instead, it is binding with all the power and rigor of marriage contracts that are customarily accepted among the Jewish people, as ordained by our Rabbis of blessed memory. We signed this marriage contract on the date mentioned above. Everything is clear, forceful and viable.

34. If the marriage contract is written for a widow, it should mention [the woman's name as] "so and so, the widow."¹⁰⁸The essential requirement of the marriage contract of a widow is only one hundred zuzim. In order to explain this reduction, the marriage contract mentions her status. If the marriage contract is written for a divorcee, it should mention [the woman's name as] "so and so, the divorcee."¹⁰⁹This is necessary for the reasons mentioned previously and also to identify the woman as being forbidden to the priesthood. Even if this husband leaves her a widow, she may not marry a priest, because of her previous divorce. Similarly, if she had been taken captive [by gentiles], one should write "so and so, who was taken captive," so that a priest will not err [and marry] her.¹¹⁰Such a woman is forbidden to the priesthood, as stated in Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 18:17.

[In these instances,] it is written: "And as a dowry, I will give you 100 silver zuzim, which are equivalent to 12 1/2 zuzim of [pure] silver, which are fit for you...."¹¹¹If a woman had engaged in sexual relations previously outside the context of marriage, she should also be given a ketubah of this amount according to many authorities. Others maintain that she should be given the amount usually given to a virgin bride, so that she will not be publicly embarrassed. Others differentiate between a woman who had relations only with her prospective husband (in which case, the second ruling is followed) and one who had relations with others (in which case the first ruling is followed).

35. When a legal record of the chalitzah or a ketubah for a yevamah is written, the place where the verses [from the Torah] are written should be ruled with a stylus, for it is forbidden to write three words [from the Torah] without ruling [the surface on which one writes].¹¹²The commentaries note the apparent contradiction between the Rambam's ruling here [which is also reflected in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Sotah 2:4)], and his ruling in Hilchot Sefer Torah 7:16, where he states that one may write three words, but not four, without ruling the writing surface. The Maggid Mishneh notes that both of these opinions have their source in Megillah 7b. He and other commentaries discuss this issue in Hilchot Sefer Torah.

The contradiction was brought to the attention of the Rambam's grandson, Rabbi Yehoshua, who states that the ruling in Hilchot Sefer Torah should be followed, since there the subject is given full focus, while in Hilchot Yibbum the matter is mentioned tangentially. Significantly, however, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 284:2) differs and follows the more stringent view.

A yevamah who performs chalitzah is permitted to marry on the same day on which she performed chalitzah, for she should not perform chalitzah until 90 days have passed [since her husband's death].¹¹³See Chapter 1, Halachah 19.